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Price-level, or “price-cap,” regulation offers an alluring alternative to 
the traditional technique of monitoring a regulated firm’s profits.  This 
Article contrasts price-level regulation with conventional cost-of-service 
ratemaking and with Ramsey pricing.  Price-level regulation stands as a 
market-based, incentive-driven “third way” between traditional regulation 
and complete deregulation.  Although some jurisdictions have set price 
caps according to operating cost and rate-of-return calculations that clearly 
parallel those steps in conventional ratemaking, this Article will focus on 
price-level methodologies that combine an economy-wide measure of 
inflation with an x-factor reflecting total factor productivity within a 
regulated industry. 
After addressing the simpler component of price-level regulation, the 
choice of an inflation index, this Article devotes detailed attention to the 
treatment of the x-factor by two federal ratemaking agencies, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).  Closer examination of price cap 
methodologies adopted by FERC and the FCC suggests that price-level 
regulation based on inflation and an industry-specific X factor may be 
 
 *  Justin Smith Morrill Chair in Law, Michigan State University; Of Counsel, Technology 
Law Group of Washington, D.C.  This Article extends earlier work of mine on price-level 
regulation.  See Jim Chen, The Nature of the Public Utility: Infrastructure, the Market, and the Law, 
98 NW. U. L. REV. 1617, 1668–79 (2004); Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: 
How Should the Law Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1375, 1434–42 (2003).  This Article’s 
legal and economic analysis, however, differs considerably.  Needless to say, so does its conclusion.  
This Article’s title pays allusive tribute to STEPHEN G. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 
(1982).  I presented this Article at the George Mason University School of Law on December 17, 
2014.  Barbara Bean, Santanu Ganguli, Gil Grantmore, and Vivian Okere provided helpful 
comments.  Christian Diego Alcocer Argüello and Matthew Downer supplied capable research 
assistance.  Special thanks to Heather Elaine Worland Chen.  
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further streamlined.  This Article concludes by describing how price-level 
regulation might be accomplished through the application of a single, 
industry-specific index of input costs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Conventional rate-of-return regulation richly deserves its derogatory 
reputation as “the most speculative undertaking . . . in the history of 
[Anglo-American] jurisprudence.”1  Rate regulation is a seemingly bootless 
quest to set prices according to competitive market conditions that do not 
exist and cannot emerge as long as a legal ratemaking apparatus remains in 
 
1.  West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 689 (1935) (Stone, J., 
dissenting). 
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place.2  In traditional public utility law, “the burden of intrusive regulatory 
procedures and the risk of capture seem unavoidable.”3  Many pitfalls 
plague the conventional technique of determining a rate-regulated firm’s 
revenue requirement according to the sum of its prudently incurred 
operating costs and a reasonable rate of return on investment.  Almost all 
of these ills can be traced to a fundamental informational asymmetry: 
relative to regulators, firm managers enjoy vastly superior access to 
information about the firm’s true costs and opportunities for profit.4 
Price-level, or “price-cap,” regulation offers an alluring alternative to 
the traditional technique of monitoring a regulated firm’s profits.5  Part II 
of this Article contrasts price-level regulation with conventional cost-of-
service ratemaking and with Ramsey pricing.  Price-level regulation stands 
as a market-based, incentive-driven “third way” between traditional 
regulation and complete deregulation.6 
Part III provides formal specifications of price-level regulation.  
Although some jurisdictions have set price caps according to operating cost 
and rate-of-return calculations that clearly parallel those steps in 
conventional ratemaking,7 this Article will focus on methodologies that 
combine an economy-wide measure of inflation with an x-factor reflecting 
total factor productivity within a regulated industry. 
Part IV addresses the simpler component of price-level regulation, the 
choice of an inflation index.  Part V devotes detailed attention to the 
treatment of the x-factor by two federal ratemaking agencies, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC).  Although these agencies have never explicitly 
cooperated, closer examination of price cap methodologies adopted by 
 
2.  See generally Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. 
REV. 548, 611–16 (1969). 
3.  JOSÉ A. GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, REGULATING INFRASTRUCTURE: MONOPOLY, 
CONTRACTS, AND DISCRETION 243 (2003). 
4.  See Mark A. Jamison, Regulation: Price Cap and Revenue Cap, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 1245, 1247 (Barney L. Capehart ed., 2007). 
5.  For an overview of the technique, see JORDAN J. HILLMAN & RONALD R. 
BRAEUTIGAM, PRICE LEVEL REGULATION FOR DIVERSIFIED PUBLIC UTILITIES: AN 
ASSESSMENT (1989).  For a sense of the controversy that the technique sparked upon its 
introduction to the United States, compare Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Price Level Regulation Based 
on Inflation Is Not an Attractive Alternative to Profit Level Regulation, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 665 
(1990) with Jordan J. Hillman & Ronald R. Braeutigam, The Potential Benefits and Problems 
of Price Level Regulation: A More Hopeful Perspective, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 695 (1990). 
6.  See HILLMAN & BRAEUTIGAM, supra note 5, at 698. 
7.  See, e.g., Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 
679, 693 (1923); Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC (Oil Pipe Lines II), 281 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
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FERC and the FCC suggests that price-level regulation based on inflation 
and an industry-specific X factor may be further streamlined.  Part VI 
describes how price-level regulation might be accomplished through the 
application of a single, industry-specific index of input costs. 
II. PRICE-LEVEL REGULATION IN RELATION TO CONVENTIONAL 
RATEMAKING AND RAMSEY PRICING 
A. Curing Flaws in Conventional Ratemaking 
Within the United States, a legal system accustomed to borrowing 
heavily from English common law,8 price-level regulation is a decidedly 
recent and statute-based British import.  British regulators devised the 
price-level strategy in the 1980s as a method for disciplining British 
Telecommunications after privatization.9  In truth, the United States had 
already collected extensive experience with similar regulatory mechanisms.  
Maximum rates and price ceilings in American legal history are no younger 
than the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in the Permian Basin Area Rate 
Cases,10 which upheld a price ceiling based on average-cost ratemaking.  
Other American antecedents include the full-avoided cost pricing rule that 
the Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) prescribed for 
cogenerators and small-power producers11 and the “new gas” price ceilings 
imposed by the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA).12  PURPA and the 
NGPA—both, coincidentally, enacted in 1978—intended their price 
ceilings to invite new entry.13  That history is in harmony with the incentive-
based motivation that underlies price-level regulation. 
 
8.  For merely one example of the influence of English common law on American 
constitutional law, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 86–90 (1970).  With respect to the 
impact of common law on American statutes, see Sekhar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2720, 2724–
25 (2013); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999).  See generally, e.g., LAWRENCE M. 
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 4–5 (3d ed. 2005); 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW 
IN AMERICAN HISTORY: FROM THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 48–51 
(2012); Herbert Pope, The English Common Law in the United States, 24 HARV. L. REV. 6, 6–
7 (1910). 
9.  See MARK ARMSTRONG, SIMON COWAN & JOHN STUART VICKERS, REGULATORY 
REFORM: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND BRITISH EXPERIENCE 165–94 (1994); GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, 
supra note 3, at 220–23; STEPHEN C. LITTLECHILD, REGULATION OF BRITISH 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS’ PROFITABILITY (1983). 
10.  390 U.S. 747 (1968). 
11.  See generally Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983). 
12.  See generally Mobil Oil Expl. & Prod. S.E., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 498 U.S. 211 
(1991). 
13.  Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3350; Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat 3117. 
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Price-level regulation marks a conscious departure from conventional 
cost-of-service ratemaking by emphasizing commodity or service prices 
rather than the revenue required to sustain a publicly franchised firm.14  In 
lieu of traditional restraints on the regulated firm’s profitability—which 
force regulators to review the prudency of the firm’s operating costs, assess 
the value of its productive assets, determine an appropriate rate of return, 
and gauge the impact of taxes and depreciation, and allocate charges among 
distinct customer classes15the price-level alternative entitles a regulated 
firm to conduct its business as it sees fit, provided that its prices remain 
below a certain level.16 
These elements of conventional ratemaking are on full display in the 
simplest formulation of the regulated firm’s revenue requirement17: 
RR = r  B + OC + T 
where18: 
 RR  revenue requirement 
 r  rate of return 
  B  rate base (value of capital investments, net of depreciation) 
 OC operating costs 
 T  taxes 
Price-level regulation addresses at least four of the most severe defects 
in conventional, cost-of-service rate regulation.19  First, perverse incentives 
arise from a profit-regulated firm’s ability to pass operating costs through to 
ratepayers and to collect a return on all investment it can characterize as 
“prudent.”20  The celebrated Averch–Johnson hypothesis posits that firms 
guaranteed a “just and reasonable” rate of return will overinvest to the 
 
14.  Pierce, supra note 5, at 666. 
15.  Darin W. Kempke, Regulated Utilities, in 2 ACCOUNTANTS HANDBOOK: SPECIAL 
INDUSTRIES AND SPECIAL TOPICS, at 36-6 to 36-11 (D.R. Carmichael & Lynford Graham eds., 
12th ed. 2012). 
16.  Id. 
17.  See, e.g., Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 56–57 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999); RICHARD E. MATHENY, TAXATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES § 2.04 (2014) (“The 
Ratemaking Process”). 
18.  Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 56–57. 
19.  See Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 178 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Policy & 
Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6791, 6853 & n.450 (1990), 
on reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991). 
20.  See Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (observing that the recovery 
of “all costs reasonably incurred in one period” gave “pipelines . . . perverse incentives to ‘gold-
plate’ facilities”); Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 178. 
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extent that rate regulation shields them from the discipline of the 
marketplace.21 
Second, the impossibility of extending a regulatory scheme to all 
business activities ostensibly within the reach of a natural monopolist22 gives 
rise to that hoary practice of regulated firms, shifting money between 
regulated and unregulated lines of business.23  Baxter’s Law, named after 
the architect of the Bell breakup decree (William F. Baxter),24 posits that a 
monopolist will “evade [rate] regulation by leveraging its market power 
from the [monopolized] platform market into adjacent and 
unregulated . . . markets.”25  Price-level regulation, in other words, blunts 
the motivation that dominant firms might otherwise have to use rents from 
imperfectly regulated lines of business to cross-subsidize their quest for 
greater power over unregulated markets. 
A crucial corollary of this principle is regulatory reform of funding for 
universal service.  Conventional ratemaking funds service to low-income 
and/or high-cost customers through implicit subsidies embedded within 
complex rate structures charging above-cost rates to those classes of 
customers who were presumed capable of financing universal service.26  By 
 
21.  See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory 
Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Harold H. Wein, Fair Rate of Return and 
Incentives─Some General Considerations, in PERFORMANCE UNDER REGULATION 39 (Harry 
M. Trebing ed., 1968); Stanislaw H. Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An 
Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL. ECON. 30 (1963).  See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, JOHN M. 
VERNON & JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 387–91 
(2d ed. 1995) (reviewing the literature addressing the Averch–Johnson hypothesis). 
22.  The impossibility of this task does not keep regulators from trying and trying again, 
and failing each time.  Compare, e.g., United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), with 
ALBERT CAMUS, The Myth of Sisyphus, in THE PLAGUE, THE FALL, EXILE AND THE 
KINGDOM, AND SELECTED ESSAYS 589 (Stuart Gilbert, David Bellos & Justin O’Brien eds., 
2004). 
23.  See, e.g., Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. 
Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930); City of Houston v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318 (1922); Sw. Bell 
Corp. v. FCC, 896 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
24.  See United States v. W. Elec. Co., 569 F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d mem. sub 
nom. California v. United States, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983); United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 
(1983), terminated by Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 601(a)(1), 110 
Stat. 56, 143–44, reprinted in 47 U.S.C. § 152 note (2012) (Applicability of Consent Decrees and 
Other Law). 
25.  Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L. 
REV. 41, 71–72 (2003); see also Paul L. Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: 
Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 1249, 1249–50 (1999). 
26.  See generally Jim Chen, Subsidized Rural Telephony and the Public Interest: A Case 
Study in Cooperative Federalism and Its Pitfalls, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 307, 318–
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commanding that universal service support be made “explicit,”27 the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 effectively banned the funding of 
universal service through implicit cross-subsidies.28 
In other words, cross-subsidization, whether achieved by dominant 
firms exploiting gaps within conventional regulation or indulged by 
regulators as part of their mission to ensure universal service, are 
incompatible with the contemporary commitments to open entry and 
competitive neutrality.  Although price-level regulation does not directly 
provide an explicit, competitively neutral mechanism for funding universal 
service,29 price caps are, at an absolute minimum, compatible with 
regulatory reforms designed to remove implicit cross-subsidies from filed 
tariffs and other expressions of conventional ratemaking.30 
Third, conventional rate-of-return regulation is, not to put too fine a 
point on it, slow and expensive.  As if to prove the regulatory command, 
“Thou Shalt Not Optimize in Piecemeal Fashion,”31 the failure to complete 
the transition from rate-of-return regulation to its price-level equivalent 
leaves a firm free to “escape the burden of costs incurred in its unregulated 
or price cap business by shifting them to [a] rate-of-return affiliate, which 
can pass them on to ratepayers.”32  Allowing firms to choose between 
inflation-based and valuation-based methodologies injects “an exciting new 
twist” into rate regulation and “invites an enormous amount of 
gamesmanship.”33  Abortive conversion from conventional ratemaking also 
facilitates official misconduct, especially if regulators “arbitrarily switch 
back and forth between methodologies in a way which require[s] investors 
 
23 (2003). 
27.  47 U.S.C. § 254(e) (2012). 
28.  See, e.g., Comsat Corp. v. FCC, 250 F.3d 931, 938 (5th Cir. 2001); Alenco Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. FCC, 201 F.3d 608, 623 (5th Cir. 2000); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 153 F.3d 523, 537–38 
(8th Cir. 1998). 
29.  For judicial observations on that regulatory goal, see Qwest Corp. v. FCC, 258 F.3d 
1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 2001); Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 418 (5th 
Cir. 1999). 
30.  See Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates v. FCC, 372 F.3d 454, 457–58, 461 
(D.C. Cir. 2004). 
31.  Gregory S. Crespi, Market Magic: Can the Invisible Hand Strangle Bigotry?, 72 B.U. 
L. REV. 991, 1010–11 (1992); see also Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 641, 652 (1980) (“The general theory of second best demonstrates that if there are 
distortions from competitive equilibrium throughout the economy due to taxes or monopoly, 
for example, a change that can be viewed as value maximizing in one small sector may actually 
decrease value overall.” (footnote omitted)).  See generally R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 
The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956). 
32.  Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 180 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
33.  Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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to bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the 
benefit of good investments at others.”34 
Finally, price-level regulation promotes the efficient pricing of 
individual products offered by a regulated firm.  Although “[t]he most basic 
idea in welfare economics and price theory is that it is efficient for a good to 
be produced and consumed if the marginal cost of production is less than 
the marginal benefit of consumption,” virtually every question of regulatory 
rate design concerns circumstances in which “the fixed costs of production 
must be recovered through raising prices above marginal costs.”35  Prices in 
a regulated setting routinely exceed marginal cost because the firm 
otherwise “will not be able to cover its fixed costs if it sets prices equal to 
marginal cost.”36 
B. Ramsey Pricing 
Despite these virtues, price-level regulation may not offer an ideal 
solution to the problem of optimal pricing.  Outright deregulation, or at least 
its closest regulatory equivalent, may outperform both conventional 
ratemaking and its price-level alternative.37  Nearly a century ago, 
economist Frank Ramsey proposed a pricing methodology that minimizes 
the social loss from setting prices above marginal cost.38  When the 
government imposes taxes on goods, it can best minimize those taxes’ 
distortion of consumption patterns (and therefore minimize the efficiency 
loss from such taxes) by levying taxes in inverse proportion to the elasticity 
of demand for each good.  Later work, especially by Marcel Boiteux, 
extended Ramsey’s insight from its original context in taxation to the 
allocation of fixed costs in utility ratemaking.39 
 
34.  Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989).  But see Verizon Commc’ns 
Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 526 (2002) (failing to identify any constitutionally significant 
“reliance interests” that would be “jeopardized by an intentional switch in ratesetting 
methodologies”). 
35.  William P. Rogerson, New Economic Perspectives on Telecommunications 
Regulation, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1489, 1491 (2000).  
36.  Id. 
37.  Cf. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated 
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1363 (1998) (describing the long-term trend of the 
law of regulated industries toward “complete detariffing, elimination of all entry restrictions, 
and outright abolition” of regulatory supervision). 
38.  See Frank P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). 
39.  See Marcel Boiteux, Sur la gestion des Monopoles Publics astreints à l’équilibre 
budgétaire, 24 ECONOMETRICA 22 (1956), translated in Marcel Boiteux, On the Management 
of Public Monopolies Subject to Budgetary Constraints, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 219 (William J. 
Baumol & David F. Bradford trans., 1971).  See generally ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS 
OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 137–41 (photo. reprint 1988) (1st ed. 1970); 
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Ramsey pricing “in its pure form” often confounds regulators with 
insurmountable “difficulties in getting the data needed.”40  Price-level 
regulation overcomes this difficulty by effectively delegating cost allocation 
decisions to the regulated firm.41  Armed with “an appropriate price cap 
scheme,” a “regulator does not need to know demand elasticities to 
implement Ramsey prices,” but rather “can induce the regulated firm itself 
to choose Ramsey prices.”42  Price-level regulation thus contains its own 
form of rate design.  Common costs are assigned to customers whose 
demand for utility service is the most elastic:
 
Ramsey pricing [is] designed for cases where marginal cost is 
below average cost.  Where that is true, a regulated firm forced to 
sell at marginal cost cannot recoup its total costs.  Under Ramsey 
pricing, the regulator allows firms to charge each user a premium 
over marginal cost in inverse proportion to the elasticity of the 
user’s demand.  Because the highest charges fall on the most 
inelastic demanders, the impact on total usage is minimized.  
Thus, . . . [Ramsey pricing] would reconcile the [regulated firm’s] 
need for revenue to cover total costs with the least possible 
distortion of demand . . . .43
 
Ramsey pricing is easy to articulate as a regulatory norm but notoriously 
difficult to implement within political constraints on regulation.44  Formally, 
the Lerner index measures a firm’s market power according to the 
negative inverse of the price elasticity of demand faced by the firm.45  
Setting rates according to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand 
therefore gives legal effect to the regulated firm’s market power.  Market 
 
KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL 
MONOPOLY 122–25 (1991). 
40.  Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. ICC, 985 F.2d 589, 596 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also William B. 
Tye & Herman B. Leonard, On the Problems of Applying Ramsey Pricing to the Railroad 
Industry with Uncertain Demand Elasticities, 17 TRANSP. RES. 439 (1983). 
41.  See JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, COMPETITION IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 66–67 (2000); Ingo Vogelsang & Jörg Finsinger, Regulatory 
Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multiproduct Monopoly Firms, 10 BELL J. ECON. 
157 (1979). 
42.  Rogerson, supra note 35, at 1492. 
43.  Burlington N., 985 F.2d at 596. 
44.  For a flavor of ongoing debates over Ramsey pricing, see Egbert Dierker, The 
Optimality of Boiteux-Ramsey Pricing, 59 ECONOMETRICA 99 (1991); Tae Hoon Oum & 
Michael W. Tretheway, Ramsey Pricing in the Presence of Externality Costs, 22 J. TRANSP. 
ECON. & POL’Y 307 (1988); William G. Shepherd, Ramsey Pricing: Its Uses and Limits, 2 UTILS. 
POL’Y 296 (1992). 
45.  See Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly 
Power, 1 REV. ECON. STUD. 157 (1934). 
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power, after all, is the power to control prices.46  In more colorful terms, 
setting rates according to Ramsey pricing prices utility services according to 
their value to the purchaser, and thereby allows the regulated firm to charge 
“all that the traffic will bear.”47 
The real world presence of inequality and the widely held political 
instinct against exacerbating unequal distributions of wealth in favor of the 
affluent hamper the complete implementation of Ramsey pricing.  By 
allowing “the highest charges [to] fall on the most inelastic demanders,” 
Ramsey pricing prescribes a harshly regressive approach to rate regulation.48  
The burden of high rates would fall most heavily on citizens who are least 
able and least likely to find alternatives to utility services priced according 
to Ramsey’s approach.  This criticism of Ramsey pricing finds a nearly 
exact parallel in defenses of progressive taxation.49  At an extreme, 
Ramsey pricing may raise rates to such high levels as to create “the false 
illusion that a government agency is keeping watch over rates, . . . when it is 
in fact doing no such thing.”50 
In the fierce battle over its Total Element Long-Run Incremental Cost 
Rule (TELRIC),51 the FCC rebuffed calls for Ramsey pricing of telephone 
network elements that incumbent local exchange carriers were required to 
 
46.  E.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956); accord 
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966); see also 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(q) (2016) 
(defining a “[d]ominant carrier” as one “found by the [Federal Communications] Commission 
to have market power (i.e., power to control prices)”). 
47.  See, e.g., INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMM’N, PROPOSED ADVANCES IN FREIGHT 
RATES BY CARRIERS, ICC Docket No. 3500, U.S. Doc. 5910, S. Doc. No. 61-725, at 4072–74 
(1911) (describing the railroads’ proposed rule that would enable them to charge “all that the 
traffic will bear”); cf. id. at 4119 (acknowledging that pricing carriage at rates that “the traffic 
will bear” allows the railroad to extract the value of that service from the shipper).  These 
hearings by the Interstate Commerce Commission represented merely one chapter in the 
United States government’s decades-long assault on the trans-Missouri and trans-Illinois 
railroad trusts.  See generally United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
48.  Burlington N., 985 F.2d at 596. 
49.  See, e.g., Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 770 
(1995); Jim Chen, Progressive Taxation: An Aesthetic and Moral Defense, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. 
REV. 659, 676–79 (2012); Richard A. Musgrave, Clarifying Tax Reform, 70 TAX NOTES 731, 
733 (1996). 
50.  Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 474 F.2d 416, 422 (D.C. Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 417 
U.S. 380 (1974); accord Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1510 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
51.  See generally Jim Chen, The Death of the Regulatory Compact: Adjusting Prices and 
Expectations in the Law of Regulated Industries, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1265, 1292–95, 1305–13 
(2006); Gregory L. Rosston & Roger G. Noll, The Economics of the Supreme Court’s Decision 
on Forward Looking Costs, 1 REV. NETWORK ECON. 81 (2002); David E.M. Sappington, On 
the Design of Input Prices: Can TELRIC Prices Ever Be Optimal?, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 
197 (2006). 
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sell to competitors on an unbundled basis, despite the endorsement of that 
practice by academic commentators52 and at least one Supreme Court 
Justice.53  A majority of the high court eventually concluded that Ramsey 
pricing’s primary economic attraction “appears to be a drawback when [it 
is] used as a method of setting rates for the wholesale market in unbundled 
network elements.”54  Specifically, because entrants into local exchange 
markets were expected to exhibit “highest” demand for “the costly 
bottleneck elements, duplication of which is neither likely nor desired, high 
lease rates for these elements would be the rates most likely to deter market 
entry.”55 
Price-level regulation therefore stands between the economically flawed 
approach of conventional ratemaking and the politically fraught alternative 
of Ramsey pricing.56  Its principal virtue lies in avoidance of conventional 
ratemaking’s deepest pitfalls.  At the same time, by imposing some ceiling, 
or “cap,” on prices charged by a regulated firm, price-level regulation 
largely escapes the usual allegations leveled against Ramsey pricing, that 
setting prices inverse to elasticities of demand, even if technically 
achievable, abdicates control over prices to monopolists and enables them 
to charge all that the traffic will bear.57 
Precisely how well price-level regulation navigates this third way 
depends on its specification and its application to actual markets.  I now turn 
to this question. 
III. SPECIFYING PRICE-LEVEL REGULATION 
There are two strikingly distinct formulaic methods of specifying price-
level regulation.  I shall first dispense with the so-called forecast approach, 
if only to recognize the similarities between this method and the 
conventional ratemaking formula that price caps are purportedly designed 
to displace.  I will then focus on the method that commands the lion’s share 
 
52.  See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, The Tragedy of the Telecommons: 
Government Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements Under the Telecommunications Act of 
1996, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1081, 1109 (1997). 
53.  See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 426–27 (1999) (Breyer, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that the “FCC disfavors Ramsey 
pricing, but” complaining that the agency “does not explain why a contrary judgment would 
conflict with” the Telecommunications Act of 1996 “or otherwise be arbitrary or 
unreasonable”). 
54.  Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 515 (2002). 
55.  Id. at 515–16. 
56.  Compare, e.g., Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 56–57 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), with Ramsey, supra note 38.  
57.  See supra note 47. 
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of this Article’s attention: price-level regulation through the application of 
a general inflation index and an industry-specific measure of productivity. 
A. The Forecast Approach 
The forecast approach to price-level regulation proceeds in three steps.58  
First, the regulator determines the rate base for the initial year t of price-
level regulation by reference to some base year: 
 
)(
1
1
1 i
t
i
iit DCBB  

  
 
where: 
Bi rate base in year i 
Ci capital expenditures in year i 
Di depreciation in year i 
Second, the regulator projects operating expenses and unit sales for each 
year under the price cap.  Third and finally, the regulator calculates a 
weighted average cost of capital as the rate of return needed to finance the 
price-capped firm: 
 
 
 
where: 
 n  expected duration of the price cap 
 PjQj projected revenue for year j 
 OCj operating expenses for year j 
 Tj  taxes for year j 
  R  rate of return—i.e., the weighted average cost of debt and 
equity59 
Despite its superficial complexity, the so-called forecast approach to 
price-level regulation is quite faithful to the traditional cost-of-service 
ratemaking formula for computing a regulated firm’s revenue requirement: 
 
58.  See generally RICHARD GREEN & MARTIN RODRÍGUEZ PARDINA, RESETTING 
PRICE CONTROLS FOR PRIVATIZED UTILITIES: A MANUAL FOR REGULATORS 77–80 (1999); 
Jamison, supra note 4, at 1247–48. 
59.  See GREEN & PARDINA, supra note 58, at 87–91 (describing different methods for 
computing the rate of return); cf. Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 57, 60–63 (describing the use of 
discounted cash flow analysis to compute the cost of common equity as the most contentious 
part of computing the “weighted average . . . of the three elements comprising” a regulated 
firm’s “capital structure: long-term debt, preferred stock, and common equity”). 
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RR = r  B + OC + T.60  Indeed, the forecast method so closely tracks 
conventional ratemaking that it is better evaluated as a method for 
transitioning what had previously been a government-owned enterprise 
(such as British Telecommunications) to private ownership under 
regulatory supervision.61  In the United States, which rarely encounters such 
transitions from outright public ownership to regulation of a newly 
privatized, shareholder-owned firm on a public utility model,62 there may be 
no practically meaningful distinction between conventional ratemaking and 
the forecast approach to price-level regulation. 
B. Inflation Minus x-Factor 
In order to distinguish itself from conventional ratemaking’s focus on 
firm-specific revenue, price-level regulation must begin with an economic 
baseline that is wholly independent of the firm’s historic costs and revenues 
and likewise unconnected to regulatory forecasts of the rate of return 
needed to attract and retain private investment in the firm.  What this 
Article will treat as true price-level regulation combines independent 
benchmarks of prices with industry-specific adjustments of a regulated 
firm’s freedom to raise prices in a given time period. 
The success of price-level regulation often hinges on the computation of 
its initial baseline.63  To the extent that an initial price cap is based on old 
rates computed according to the historical cost of providing service, price-
level regulation may not deliver significant gains vis-à-vis conventional 
 
60.  See GREEN & PARDINA, supra note 58. 
61.  See, e.g., ARMSTRONG, COWAN & VICKERS, supra note 9, at 165–94. 
62.  Rate regulation in the United States does address publicly owned and quasi-public 
enterprises, inter alia, with respect to the United States Postal Service, see, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of 
Greeting Card Publishers v. U.S. Postal Serv., 462 U.S. 810 (1983) (assigning to the Postal Rate 
Commission the primary responsibility for setting postage rates under the Postal 
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 3622(b) (1982)), and the Bonneville Power Administration, 
see 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a)(2) (1982) (setting rates within the Bonneville Power Administration so 
“that such rates . . . are sufficient to assure repayment of the Federal investment in the Federal 
Columbia River Power System over a reasonable number of years [and] . . . are based upon the 
Administrator’s total system costs”); Alcoa, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 698 F.3d 774, 
789 (9th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that the “BPA must set rates ‘with a view to encouraging the 
widest possible diversified use of electric power at the lowest possible rates to consumers 
consistent with sound business principles,’” without being committed to “always charg[ing] the 
lowest possible rates” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 838g(1) (2006); California Energy Comm’n v. 
Bonneville Power Admin., 909 F.2d 1298, 1307–08 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
63.  See Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E.M. Sappington, Setting the X Factor in Price-Cap 
Regulation Plans, 16 J. REG. ECON. 5, 9 (1999); Peter Navarro, The Simple Analytics of 
Performance-Based Ratemaking: A Guide for the PBR Regulator, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 105, 128 
(1996). 
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ratemaking.64  Once an initial level has been set, an effective cap “require[s] 
annual adjustments to the [firm’s] price cap indices for inflation and certain 
‘exogenous’ changes outside the [firm’s] control, coupled with a percentage 
offset for anticipated productivity gains.”65  The maximum allowable price 
thus varies according to two adjustments: (1) upward, generally, as 
prescribed by a gauge of general inflation, and (2) downward in anticipation 
of the extent to which “the [regulated] industry [will] experience[] faster 
productivity growth than the economy generally.”66 
The following formula describes price-level regulation in algebraic 
terms67:
 
Pt = Pb  (1 + π – x – z)t 
where: 
Pb baseline price cap 
Pt price cap in year t after the onset of price-level regulation 
π inflation rate68 
x x-factor, sometimes called a “minimum productivity offset”69 
z a further adjustment for regulation-specific factors, sometimes 
called a “consumer productivity dividend”70
 
If we relax the assumption that a price cap would remain constant over 
a designated period before the agency adjusts its formula, we would do well 
to restate this formula in even more general terms, one that allows annual 
variation in all three parameters, π, x, and z: 
 
Pt  Pb  (1  i  xi  zi)
ib
t  
 
64.  See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 486 (2002); U.S. Tel. Ass’n v. FCC 
(USTA), 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Alfred E. Kahn, Timothy J. Tardiff & Dennis L. 
Weisman, The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of Its 
Implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 319, 
330–32 (1999); Daniel F. Spulber & Christopher S. Yoo, Access to Networks: Economic and 
Constitutional Connections, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 885, 910 (2003). 
65.  Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
66.  Id. 
67.  See Jeff D. Makholm, Elusive Efficiency and the X-Factor in Incentive Regulation: The 
Törnqvist v. DEA/Malmquist Dispute, in THE LINE IN THE SAND: THE SHIFTING BOUNDARY 
BETWEEN MARKETS AND REGULATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 95, 97–98 (Sarah Voll & 
Mike King eds., 2007).  See generally id. at 107–10 (providing a full mathematical derivation of 
the basic formula for price-level regulation). 
68.  By convention, economic literature designates inflation by the Greek letter π.  In the 
context of this Article, π does not designate the transcendental number associated with the 
circumference of a circle or with trigonometric functions. 
69.  See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 79 F.3d at 1198. 
70.  Id.  
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where i indicates an indexing variable and Pb indicates the baseline price 
cap. 
The foregoing three-parameter approach to price-level regulation is 
evident in the rules of the Federal Communications Commission.  The 
FCC defines “[p]rice cap regulation” as a “method of regulation of 
dominant carriers provided in [47 C.F.R.] §§ 61.41 through 61.49.”71  
Dominant carriers are those “found by the Commission to have market 
power (i.e., power to control prices).”72  The FCC calculates a “Price Cap 
Index (PCI),” or an “index of prices applying to each basket of services 
of each carrier subject to price cap regulation,”73 according to “the 
following formula”:74 
 
 
 
where: 
GDP-PI represents the “GDP Price Index,” or the “estimate of 
the Chain-Type Price Index for Gross Domestic Product 
published by the United States Department of Commerce.”75 
X represents the productivity adjustment known as the x-factor.76 
Z represents the “dollar effect of current regulatory changes when 
compared to the regulations in effect at the time the PCI was 
updated to PCIt–1, measured at base period level of operations.”77 
R represents “[b]ase period quantities for each rate 
element . . . multiplied by the price for each rate element . . . at the 
time the PCI was updated to PCIt–1.”78 
w = R + Z, all divided by R, with respect to the service baskets 
subject to these Price Cap Index adjustments.79 
 
71.  47 C.F.R. § 61.3(ff) (2016). 
72.  Id. § 61.3(q). 
73.  Id. § 61.3(ee). 
74.  Id. § 61.45(b)(1)(i). 
75.  Id. § 61.3(r). 
76.  Special Access for Price Cap Local Exch. Carriers (Special Access I), 27 FCC Rcd. 
10,557, 10,563 (2012). 
77.  47 C.F.R. § 61.45(b)(1)(i). 
78.  Id. 
79.  Id. 
PCIt  PCIt1[1w(GDPPI  X)  ZR] 
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Shorn of its elaborations, the FCC’s Price Cap Index calculation takes 
the form of the full three-parameter formula for price-level regulation:  
Pt = Pb  (1 + π – x – z)t.80  The FCC has characterized its PCI mechanism 
as serving three purposes, each corresponding to one of the parameters, 
π, x, and z: 
The PCI is designed to limit the prices LECs charge for service.  
The PCI has three basic components: (1) a measure of inflation, 
i.e., the Gross Domestic Product (chain weighted) Price Index 
(GDP-PI); (2) a productivity factor or “X-Factor,” which 
represents the amount by which LECs can be expected to 
outperform economy-wide productivity gains; and (3) 
adjustments to account for “exogenous” cost changes that are 
outside the LEC’s control and not otherwise reflected in the PCI.81 
Because exogenous costs are “‘in general those costs that are 
triggered by administrative, legislative or judicial action beyond the 
control of the carriers,’” z-factor “adjustments for such changes 
presumably do not undermine the price caps’ incentive structures.”82 
Other modifications of the basic price cap mechanism do reduce the 
effectiveness of price-level regulation in adjusting the incentives of 
capped firms.  In specifying its price cap rules for dominant carriers, the 
FCC has codified its historic sensitivity to the potentially regressive 
redistributive effects of market-based regulation, which reach their peak 
under Ramsey pricing but are not altogether absent under price caps.83  
The FCC computes an “Actual Price Index (API)” based on “the level of 
aggregate rate element rates in [each] basket” of distinctly priced 
telephone company services.84  The FCC further divides each price cap 
 
80.  See sources cited supra note 67. 
81.  Special Access for Price Cap Local Exch. Carriers (Special Access II), 27 FCC Rcd. 
16,318, 16,320 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. at 10,563. 
82.  Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting Policy and Rules 
Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 6807 (1990), modified on 
reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991), further reconsideration dismissed, 6 FCC Rcd. 7482 
(1991)). 
83.  See Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,557. 
84.  47 C.F.R. § 61.3(b) (2016); see also id. § 61.46.  Specifically, 
[a] price cap basket is a broad grouping of services, such as special access services.  
Prices for services within a basket are limited by the PCI for the basket, which limits 
the LEC’s pricing flexibility and its incentives to shift costs.  To ascertain compliance 
with the PCI, LEC rate levels within each basket are measured through the use of an 
Annual Price Index (API).  The API is the weighted sum of the percentage change in 
LEC prices.  The API weights the rate for each rate element in the basket based on 
the quantity of each element sold in a historical base year.  The historical base year is 
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basket into service category bands and computes a “Service Band Index” 
based on “the level of aggregate rate element rates in [each] service 
category.”85 
Although the use of baskets and bands enables the FCC to calibrate 
price indexes according to the cost and demand characteristics of specific 
services,86 these devices dilute the effectiveness of price-level regulation.87  
Baskets and bands partially restore regulatory oversight of costs and 
revenue on a firm-specific basis.88  The greater the departure from the 
truly market-oriented aspects of price-level regulation, the lower the 
regulated firm’s incentives to reduce costs and to innovate.89  Regulatory 
directives ordering firms to share gains from price-level regulation with 
their customers have perhaps the most negative effect on these 
incentives.90  Acknowledging that sharing mechanisms designed to 
capture the price-capped firm’s profits for its customers’ benefit do 
“severely blunt[] the efficiency incentives of price cap regulation” and 
reintroduce many of the distortions associated with conventional rate-of-
return regulation, the FCC has eliminated sharing requirements in price-
level regulation of local exchange carriers.91 
Stripping away the z-factor and such artifices as baskets and bands 
returns price-level regulation to adjustments conducted “solely for reasons 
independent of the regulated firm’s actual behavior, notably (1) an annual 
adjustment for general price inflation . . . and (2) an automatic annual 
downward adjustment for expected improvements in firm productivity.”92  
Omission of the z-factor reduces price-level regulation to a simpler two-
 
the calendar year that immediately precedes the annual tariff filing on July 1.  A price 
cap LEC’s rates are in compliance with the cap for a basket if the API is less than or 
equal to the PCI. 
Special Access for Price Cap LECs, 27 FCC Rcd. at 16,320 n.5 (citation omitted). 
85.  47 C.F.R. § 61.3(oo); see also id. § 61.47. 
86.  See Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 988 F.2d 174, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1993); 47 C.F.R. 
§ 61.42.  
87.  See generally KEITH S. ROSENN, LAW AND INFLATION 21 (1982). 
88.  Id. 
89.  See Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 178. 
90.  The sharing mechanisms that the FCC imposed through its earliest price cap orders 
inspired numerous legal controversies.  See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 
1996); Nat’l Rural Telecom Ass’n, 988 F.2d at 180.  By contrast, the D.C. Circuit has upheld a 
price-cap scheme for cable television operators that omitted any sharing mechanism.  See Time 
Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 164–74 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
91.  See USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
92.  Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). 
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parameter specification, ௧ܲ ൌ ௕ܲ ∙ 	 	ሺ1 ൅ ߨ െ ݔሻ௧.93  Or in an even more 
general form that allows annual variations in inflation and total factor 
productivity: 
 
 
 
 
These specifications leave only two additional regulatory targets: the 
rate of inflation (π) and an x-factor reflecting gains in total factor 
productivity.  Parts IV and V will address each of these factors in turn. 
IV. CHOOSING THE INFLATION INDEX 
As between the two primary tasks in price-level regulation, the choice 
of an inflation index is at once less burdensome and less important.  
Because inflation affects the national economy as a whole and is not 
confined to a single industry within the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency 
(let alone an individual firm subject to that agency’s oversight), an agency 
such as FERC or the FCC must rely on extrinsic measures of price 
changes across the entire economy.94 
By the same token, the choice of an inflation index is likely to 
command substantial attention, from capped firms as well as their 
regulators, because inflation represents the primary force in price-level 
regulation that drives prices upward.95  Precisely because an “inflation 
index” represents a “factor[] outside of [entrepreneurial] control,” a 
regulated firm should “have little incentive to shift costs from 
nonregulated activities to regulated ones because it would not be able to 
increase regulated rates to recapture those costs.”96 
The proper measurement of inflation nevertheless presents a 
nontrivial chore.97  Despite the prominence of inflation in all legal 
subjects connected to economics,98 regulators have demonstrated a 
 
93.  See sources cited supra note 67. 
94.  See Jim Chen, The Price of Macroeconomic Imprecision: How Should the Law 
Measure Inflation?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1365, 1403 (2003). 
95.  Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 79 F.3d at 1198. 
96.  California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 926 (9th Cir. 1994). 
97.  Cf. ROSENN, supra note 87, at 21 (“There are billions of prices in modern economies, 
and there is no feasible method to monitor their constant movements.”).  
98.  See generally James Ming Chen, Indexing Inflation: The Impact of Methodology on 
Econometrics and Macroeconomic Policy, 1 CENT. BANK J.L. & FIN. 3 (2014); Chen, supra note 
94. 
Pt  Pb  (1  i  xi)
ib
t
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surprising reluctance to adopt a firm measure of inflation.99  In judicial 
review of administrative discretion, an agency’s failure to designate “an 
appropriate index,” let alone the failure to explain “the proper 
relationship between the appropriate inflation rate and the lower limit of 
the zone of reasonableness” for regulated rates, is reversible error.100 
To be sure, like any other form of “agency ratemaking, price cap 
regulation . . . ‘involves policy determinations in which the agency is 
acknowledged to have expertise.’”101  Moreover, “a reviewing court must 
generally be at its most deferential” when an agency “is making 
predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of 
science.”102  But review of administrative decisions routinely requires 
judges to “acquire the learning pertinent to complex technical questions 
in such fields as economics, science, technology and psychology.”103  
Judges “should not automatically succumb” to regulators’ 
“acknowledged expertise . . . overwhelmed as it were by the utter 
‘scientificity’” of the ratemaking process.104  “Restraint, yes, abdication, 
no.”105 
 
99.  See Chen, supra note 94, at 1405–07. 
100.  Ark. La. Gas Co. v. FERC, 654 F.2d 435, 443 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Farmers Union 
Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1524 nn.71–72 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (observing that FERC 
had failed to correlate changes in a rate base with inflation, whether measured by the CPI or 
by the IPD). 
101.  WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Time Warner 
Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
102.  Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); 
see also, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality 
opinion); id. at 705–06 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
103.  Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Leventhal, J., 
concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); cf. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 
662, 670 (1981) (plurality opinion) (expressing a willingness to invalidate “marginally” effective 
and “substantially” obtrusive state laws despite state officials’ claimed expertise over 
regulations designed “to promote the public health or safety”); Queensboro Farms Prods., Inc. 
v. Wickard, 137 F.2d 969, 975 (2d Cir. 1943) (describing agriculture as a field “so vast that fully 
to comprehend it would require an almost universal knowledge ranging from geology, biology, 
chemistry and medicine to the niceties of the legislative, judicial and administrative processes 
of government”). 
104.  Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1973); cf. Jackson v. 
Pollion, 733 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2013) (Posner, J.) (identifying “a widespread, and 
increasingly troublesome, discomfort among lawyers and judges confronted by a scientific or 
other technological issue”); Edward K. Cheng, Fighting Legal Innumeracy, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 
271, 276 (2014) (urging all “legal actors . . . to demand, without embarrassment, that 
quantitative researchers not only explain the conclusions of their studies, but also how and why 
the methods work”). 
105.  Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 69 (Leventhal, J., concurring). 
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There are two obvious candidates for measuring inflation.  First, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), a division of the Department of Labor, 
publishes the Consumer Price Index (CPI).106  The CPI is not a true cost-
of-living index, but rather an estimate based on a market basket of goods 
and services thought to represent average consumer spending.107  The 
broadest version of CPI, the CPI for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), 
reflects changes in the prices of all goods and services purchased for 
consumption by urban households.108  Notably, even the BLS counsels 
against the use of CPI as “a reliable measure of inflationary and 
deflationary periods” because this gauge “includes volatile food and oil 
prices.”109  The BLS also recognizes the CPI’s vulnerability “to sampling 
error since it is based on a sample of prices and not the complete 
average.”110 
The United States’ second measure of inflation is the implicit price 
deflator that the Bureau of Economic Affairs (BEA), a division of the 
Department of Commerce, derives from its measurement of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).111  The implicit price deflator reflects the 
difference between the GDP’s nominal measure of changes in the market 
value of goods, services, and structures produced by the entire United 
 
106.  See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CPI DETAILED 
REPORT: DATA FOR JANUARY 2014, at 221 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid1401.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AV25-A9BG]. 
107.  See id. 
108.  See id. 
109.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All 
Items Series, FRED, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/data/CPIAUCSL.txt [https://perma.cc/Y2MJ-
W5FP] (last updated June 6, 2016) (summarizing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer 
Price Index: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
http://stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_13 [https://perma.cc/DX73-GW5C] (last modified 
Dec. 2, 2015)); cf. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BLS HANDBOOK 
OF METHODS ch. 17, at 4 (June 2015) [hereinafter BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 
17], http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch17.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QEN-GAK2] 
(observing that “many analysts” prefer the BLS’s series for All items less food and energy as a 
more “useful” measure of “core inflation,” since it includes “[f]ood and energy” as “two of the 
most volatile components of the CPI”). 
110.  U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 109 (summarizing U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Consumer Price Index: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
http://stats.bls.gov/cpi/cpifaq.htm#Question_21 [https://perma.cc/NES9-YEEZ] (last modified 
Dec. 2, 2015)); cf. BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 17, supra note 109, at 6 (“The 
CPI is estimated for a sample of consumer purchases; it is not a complete measure of price 
change[, which requires that] all consumer transactions [be] covered.”). 
111. See BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, NIPA HANDBOOK: CONCEPTS AND METHODS 
OF THE U.S. NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS, at 2-15 & 4-22 (2014), 
http://bea.gov/national/pdf/chapters1-4.pdf [https://perma.cc/CZ4Y-XBLT]. 
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States economy and the computation of a “real” GDP that purports to 
account for the impact of inflation on nominal GDP.112 
The closely related Gross National Product (GNP) “measures the 
market value of the goods, services, and structures produced by labor and 
property supplied by U.S. residents,” including American investment 
abroad.113  The GNP is therefore distinct from the GDP, which “cover[s] 
activities that take place within the geographic borders of the United 
States,” including foreign investment in this country.114  Accordingly, 
“GDP measures the market value of the goods, services, and structures 
produced within the nation’s economy.”115  Although the United States 
officially switched from the GNP to the GDP as “the primary measure of 
U.S. production” in 1991,116 the earliest implementations of price-level 
regulation by American regulators relied upon the GNP.117  Vestiges of 
this history remain in the rules of the FCC.118 
The deprecation of GNP in the United States’ national income and 
product accounts reduces the selection of an inflation index to a binary 
choice between the CPI and the implicit price deflator of the GDP.119  
Legislative and administrative sources of law both favor the CPI 
(including CPI-U and all other variants) over the IPD as a measure of 
inflation by a rough ratio of ten to one.120  In a rare flash of insight, 
Congress indexed natural gas price ceilings under the Natural Gas Policy 
Act of 1978 according to the IPD (plus a 0.2% premium),121 evidently 
aware that the CPI systematically overstated inflation relative to the 
 
112.  Id.  
113.  Id. at 2-6 (emphasis added). 
114.  Id. (emphasis added). 
115.  Id. 
116.  Id. at 1-3 n.6, 2-4 n.29; Gross Domestic Product as a Measure of U.S. Production, 71 
SURVEY CURRENT BUS., Aug. 1991, at 8, 8. 
117.  E.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 5 FCC Rcd. 6786, 
6792–93 (1990), modified on reconsideration, 6 FCC Rcd. 2637 (1991), further reconsideration 
dismissed, 6 FCC Rcd. 7482 (1991); accord Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 28 F.3d 165, 167 (D.C. Cir. 
1994). 
118.  See 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(s) (2016) (defining the “GNP Price Index” for purposes of rate 
regulation by the FCC); id. § 76.922(b)(2)(ii), (d)(2), (f)(4) (using the GNP Price Index to 
adjust rates for basic and cable programming service tiers, to make quarterly rate adjustments, 
and to account for external costs). 
119.  See Chen, supra note 94, 1402–09. 
120.  See generally id. at 1404–09. 
121.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 3311(a), 3314(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1988), repealed, Pub. L. No. 101-60, 
§ 2(b), 103 Stat. 158, 158 (1989); Mobil Oil Expl. & Producing S.E., Inc. v. United Distrib. Cos., 
498 U.S. 211, 218, 221–22 (1991); Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Mid-La. Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319, 333, 
334–35 & n.13, 342 (1983). 
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IPD.122  Because the GDP is derived from the most comprehensive survey 
of all transactions in the United States economy, and because the BEA 
has consistently applied a chain-type, annual-weighted methodology that 
the BLS has merely begun to explore on an experimental, legally 
nonbinding basis,123 the implicit price deflator represents price-level 
regulation’s unequivocally superior choice for measuring inflation across 
the entire economy. 
In cases involving price-level regulation, the reviewing court should 
not hesitate to challenge a ratemaking agency’s decision to use a firm- or 
industry-specific price index in lieu of the broadest available measure of 
price change in the economy at large.  At least where conventional rate-
of-return regulation still holds sway, the choice between the CPI and the 
IPD should be a simple one.  In traditional rate regulation, the 
appropriate benchmark is the opportunity cost to the holder of a 
regulated firm’s common stock of making that equity investment.124  
Insofar as utility investors anticipate nothing more and nothing less than 
being “better off by investing dollars in [the regulated firm’s] securities 
than by buying real things at the time of investment,”125 the appropriate 
inflation index for all traditional ratemaking applications is the broadest 
available: the price deflator implied by the BEA’s computation of the 
Gross Domestic Product. 
There is, admittedly, at least one judicial precedent that arguably 
counsels caution in applying GDP data to conventional ratemaking.126  
Closer examination of Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC,127 
 
122.  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1752, at 72–74 (1978) (Conf. Rep.); Steven M. Spaeth, The 
Deregulation of Transportation and Natural Gas Production in the United States and Its 
Relevance to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 
43, 79 n.310 (1991). 
123.  See generally JULIE M. WHITTAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32293, THE 
CHAINED CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: WHAT IS IT AND WOULD IT BE APPROPRIATE FOR 
COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS (2013); Chen, supra note 98, at 22–24 (prepublication 
offprint). 
124.  See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 
693 (1923) (“The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial 
soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, 
to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper 
discharge of its public duties.”). 
125.  Robert A. Webb, Utility Rate Base Valuation in an Inflationary Economy, 28 
BAYLOR L. REV. 823, 847 (1976). 
126.  Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 165 F.3d 54, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
127.  Id. at 63–64.  
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however, confirms that decision’s support for the use of a broad measure 
of economic growth in price-level regulation.128 
In Williston, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a challenge to FERC’s denial 
of a pipeline’s request for a rate increase under conventional cost-of-
service ratemaking.129  A central point of dispute on review was FERC’s 
consideration of long-term growth in pipeline earnings as a component of 
the return on common equity that Williston’s shareholders were entitled 
to earn.130  FERC rejected an “industry-specific approach to long-term 
growth estimates and adopted, as an alternative, ‘the long-term growth 
rate of the economy as a whole, as measured by the gross domestic 
product.’”131  In support of its embrace of GDP to support its evaluation 
of its discounted cash flow (DCF) forecast of pipeline revenues, the 
commissione reasoned: 
[A]s companies reach maturity, their growth rates approach that 
of the economy as a whole; [and] it is reasonable to predict that, 
in the long run, a regulated firm will grow at the rate of an average 
firm in the economy, because regulation will moderate 
profitability in good and bad economic periods.132 
The D.C. Circuit upheld FERC’s treatment of GDP data, at least to 
the extent that “the Commission expanded the scope of its long-term 
growth factor from the natural gas industry to the economy as a whole, as 
reflected in the GDP.”133  The court characterized FERC’s “decision to 
adopt an economy-wide approach” as “a well-reasoned and supported 
outgrowth” of its “consideration [of] . . . the appropriate long-term 
growth factor to be used in the DCF analysis.”134  Expressing “little doubt 
that GDP is among the most commonly used and widely available 
measures of economy-wide growth,” the court upheld “FERC’s decision 
to expand the scope of its long-term analysis” to include GDP data.135  
 
128.  Id. at 64. 
129.  Id. at 56. 
130.  See id. at 59–60; cf. id. at 57 (citing NEPCO Mun. Rate Comm’n v. FERC, 668 F.2d 
1327, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1117 (1982), for the proposition that “[t]he 
cost of common equity is frequently . . . a point of contention in rate making”); United States 
v. FCC, 707 F.2d 610, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (observing that a regulated utility’s cost of equity 
almost invariably exceeds its cost of debt). 
131.  Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 59 (quoting Williston Basin Interstate Pipeline Co. 79 
FERC ¶ 61,311, at 62,387 (1997)). 
132.  Id. at 59–60. 
133.  Id. at 63. 
134.  Id. at 64. 
135.  Id. 
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The court did remand for further consideration, however, in light of 
FERC’s failure to explain why it chose to introduce potentially 
contradictory “estimates of GDP created by different entities and based 
on different economic assumptions,” all in response to a seemingly 
unrelated “specific concern over the suitability of industry-
specific . . . data for use in the DCF model.”136 
The nugget of doubt in Williston therefore concerned the specific 
relationship between GDP and industry-specific data bearing on long-
term forecasts of growth in natural gas pipelines (particularly with respect 
to disparities in pipeline revenues from selling gas as a commodity and 
from transporting gas).137  Indeed, the ultimate goal in Williston, which 
after all concerned conventional ratemaking for the transportation of 
natural gas under section 4 of the Natural Gas Act,138 was to determine a 
just and reasonable rate for a single pipeline.139  That exercise typically 
accounts for inflation through conventional ratemaking’s computation of 
the rate base.140  By contrast, the entire point of choosing GDP as the 
measure of inflation in price-level regulation is to set an economy-wide 
baseline against which to evaluate growth of productivity within a specific 
regulated industry.141  That is the work of the x-factor.  This Article now 
turns to that subject. 
V. DETERMINING THE X-FACTOR 
A. The x-Factor as the Driver of Incentive-Based Regulation 
The downward adjustment of a price cap via an x-factor is designed to 
achieve the primary goal of price-level regulation: “provid[ing] better 
incentives than rate-of-return regulation” by giving regulated firms 
“opportunity to earn greater profits if they succeed in reducing costs and 
becoming more efficient.”142  “The X-factor is aimed at capturing a 
portion of expected increases in . . . productivity, so that these 
 
136.  Id. 
137.  See id. at 59. 
138.  See 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2012); Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 56. 
139.  Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 56. 
140.  See Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1523–25 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); cf. id. at 1516–17 & n.64 (identifying the inflation-laden trap of the “front-end load,” 
whereby an untrended cost rate base, which does not increase with inflation, systematically 
declines over time as it depreciates, and prescribing a solution of “using a trended, inflation-
sensitive original cost rate base”). 
141.  Williston Basin, 165 F.3d at 63–64. 
142.  Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Webb, supra 
note 125, at 847. 
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improvements, as under competition, will result in lower prices for 
consumers.”143  If properly computed, the x-factor “ensure[s] that price 
changes reflect changing costs the same way as in competitive markets,” 
by aligning “[c]hanges in industry prices” with “changes in industry 
costs.”144 
The x-factor is what distinguishes the prices of inputs and changes in 
productivity within a regulated industry from parallel trends in the 
broader economy.145  Because “changes in an individual firm’s prices 
relative to its costs differ from an industry average” only to the extent that 
the firm’s “productivity growth differs from the average productivity 
growth of its industry,” the resulting “variation in profits” provides “the 
carrot or stick” by which price-level regulation, through imitation of “the 
competitive process[,] rewards efficiency gains.”146 
As a matter of administrative law, the x-factor must bear some 
relationship to a measure of productivity, lest the ratemaking agency “set 
the X-factor arbitrarily and capriciously.”147  To establish a rational basis 
for constraining the regulated firm to raise prices, regulators typically 
begin by deriving a “minimum productivity offset” from historical trends 
of long-term productivity growth in the regulated industry.148  More 
precisely, this productivity offset “should be calculated as the sum of the 
difference in productivity growth and the difference in input price growth 
between the [regulated sector] and the economy as a whole.”149  This 
calculation assumes “that historic productivity increases will be matched 
in the future.”150 
 
143.  USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel 
v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 319 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant 
Carriers, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195, 3394 (1988). 
144.  Makholm, supra note 67, at 96. 
145.  See JOHN VICKERS & GEORGE K. YARROW, PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 296 (1989); Robert Loube, Price Cap Regulation: Problems and Solutions, 71 LAND 
ECON. 286, 289–90 (1995); Ingo Vogelsang, Optimal Price Regulation for Natural and Legal 
Monopolies, 8 ECONOMÍA MEXICANA, NUEVA ÉPOCA 5, 10 (1999). 
146.  Makholm, supra note 67, at 96; see also id. at 97 (describing the x-factor as part of “a 
regulatory regime designed to limit monopoly utility prices . . . in a way that mimics the 
constraints that a competitive firm would face”); Jeffrey I. Bernstein & David E.M. Sappington, 
How to Determine the X in RPI-X Regulation: A User’s Guide, 24 TELECOMMS. POL’Y 63, 64 
(2001). 
147.  Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel, 265 F.3d at 329. 
148.  See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
149.  USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing In re Price Cap Performance 
Review for Local Exch. Carriers, 12 FCC Rcd. 16,642, 16,680 (1997)). 
150.  Id. 
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The x-factor is consciously designed to raise regulated firms’ incentive 
to reduce cost and to pursue revenue-enhancing technological 
improvements.151  The size of the x-factor, given its designation as the 
minimum productivity offset, hinges on the extent to which regulators 
believe that price-level regulation can spur efficiency gains through 
technological and managerial change.  A higher minimum productivity 
offset represents a stronger commitment to technology forcing.  
Whatever its intended purpose, the x-factor carries great practical 
significance.  In one 1999 case involving an FCC price cap, each 0.1% 
change in the x-factor “represent[ed] a $23 million change in the industry-
wide access charge” collectible by local exchange carriers.152 
Proper evaluation of the x-factor demands that this critical 
component of price-level regulation be distinguished from legal 
considerations that are not intended to affect the incentives of regulated 
firms.  Special care must be taken to distinguish true x-factors—namely, 
those designed to track productivity gains within a regulated industry—
from other regulatory concepts. 
In at least one instance, the FCC has used the term “X-factor” to 
describe a price cap adjustment mechanism that bore no relationship to 
industry-wide productivity.153  The FCC’s “CALLS Order” adopted a 
separate pricing basket for special access services and purported to apply 
a distinct x-factor to the special access basket.154  “Special access services 
encompass all services that do not use local switches,” including “services 
that employ dedicated facilities that run directly between the end user 
and an interexchange carrier’s (IXC) point of presence, where an IXC 
connects its network with the local exchange carrier’s (LEC) network, or 
between two discrete end user locations.”155  More succinctly, “special 
access is a dedicated transmission link between two locations, most often 
provisioned via high-capacity circuits.”156 
 
151.  See Makholm, supra note 67, at 96 (describing how competition and its emulation 
through price-level regulation “punishes firms that are slow to innovate, to reduce costs, or to 
respond to consumer demands”). 
152.  USTA, 188 F.3d at 524. 
153.  See Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., 15 FCC Rcd. 12,962, 12,974–75 
(2000), aff’d in part and rev’d in part sub nom. Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 
F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002). 
154.  See id. 12,974–75, 13,033–34. 
155.  Special Access II, 27 FCC Rcd. 16,318, 16,319 n.1 (2012). 
156.  AT&T Inc. & BellSouth Corp., 22 F.C.C.R. 5662, 5677 (2007).   
Special access services—services that provide dedicated, high-quality data 
connections—are a vital input to our broadband economy.  Mobile providers use 
these connections to link cell towers to wireline backbone networks.  Banks, credit 
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Unlike the x-factor adopted by the FCC in other contexts, the 
purported x-factor adopted by the CALLS Order was “not a productivity 
factor.”157  “Rather, it represented ‘a transitional mechanism . . . to lower 
rates for a specified period of time for special access.”158  Of course, even 
if a price cap adjustment is decoupled from any specific measure of 
productivity, the agency must still “provide a rational explanation of how 
it derived the precise percentage,” lest the agency be given “free reign 
[sic] to set” this adjustment “arbitrarily and capriciously.”159 
The computation of the x-factor must likewise be distinguished from 
adjustments that are more appropriately characterized as z-factor 
considerations.  To complement downward adjustment of rates by the x-
factor, regulators sometimes compute a “consumer productivity 
dividend” reflecting the “greater productivity gains” realized solely by 
virtue of the transition from rate-of-return regulation to the incentive-
laden system of price-level regulation.160  Unlike the minimum 
productivity offset, which reflects legal confidence that price-level 
regulation will spur positive behavioral changes by the regulated firm,161 
the consumer productivity dividend embodies the expectation that 
moving from profit-level to price-level regulation will deliver consumer 
benefits based solely on improvement in the regulatory process itself.162  
The consumer productivity dividend thus represents gains expected from 
behavioral changes by regulators.163 
 
card, technology and insurance companies . . . use special access links to communicate 
among their branch offices. . . . [T]hese services remain a $12–18 billion market 
annually. 
Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. 10,557, 10,641 (2012) (statement of Chairman Genachowski). 
157.  Special Access I, 27 FCC Rcd. at 10,564. 
158.  Id.; accord Special Access II, 27 FCC Rcd. at 16,321. 
159.  Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 329 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002).  “Free reign” is a common but embarrassing solecism for “free 
rein.”  See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY USAGE AND STYLE 193 
(2005) (“Since giving free rein . . . is . . . granting control and power to another, it is not 
surprising that [this] expression[] ha[s] been reanalyzed as free reign . . . , when the metaphor 
evokes the power that a monarch has . . . .  But the expression[] remain[s] properly free 
rein . . . .”); Free Rein, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/270005?redirectedFrom=free+rein#eid [https://perma.cc/8EZ
S-8VC4] (defining “free rein” as “a rein held loosely to allow a horse free motion; the freedom 
that this gives a horse”); Catherine Soanes, Rein or Reign?, OXFORDWORDS BLOG (Mar. 26, 
2012), http://blog.oxforddictionaries.com/2012/03/rein-or-reign [https://perma.cc/WXE2-
P5RE] (tracing confusion over these words to the decline of the horse in everyday life). 
160.  Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
161.  Id. 
162.  Id. at 1204. 
163.  Id. at 1201. 
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Any regulatory treatment of consumer productivity should be 
regarded as an element of the z-factor and therefore distinguished from 
evaluation of the x-factor.  As time goes by and economic damage from 
rate-of-return regulation recedes ever further in legal and managerial 
memory, the idea that price-level regulation per se improves consumer 
welfare becomes less tenable.  Regulators who continue to include a 
consumer productivity dividend must explain its retention.164   
B. Three Pipelines and a Phone Call 
The foregoing theoretical analysis must survive the vexatious task of 
implementing price-level regulation in practice.  To evaluate how federal 
agencies and their reviewing courts have discharged this task, including 
the pivotal computation of a productivity-based x-factor, I will examine 
the final decade of FERC’s longstanding struggle to establish price 
ceilings for oil pipelines.  The D.C. Circuit’s Oil Pipe Lines trilogy,165 
especially seen in light of an intervening decision by that court on a 
seemingly unrelated price cap set by the FCC, offers tantalizing hints on 
the possible streamlining of price-level regulation.  The Oil Pipe Lines 
trilogy and United States Telephone Ass’n provide legal support for 
reducing price-level regulation from a two-step process (involving the 
selection of an inflation index and the setting of an x-factor) into a single 
step stressing solely the average level of input costs borne by a regulated 
industry. 
1. Oil Pipe Lines I   
In passing the Hepburn Act of 1906, Congress subjected oil pipelines 
to rate regulation.166  In four orders adopted during the early 1940s,167 the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) adopted the “fair value” 
standard of Smyth v. Ames,168 albeit “without discussion, or even explicit 
recognition, of alternative bases” for regulation.169  Despite the Supreme 
 
164.  See USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
165.  Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239 
(D.C. Cir. 2002); USTA, 188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC (Oil 
Pipe Lines I), 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
166.  Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584. 
167.  Reduced Pipe Line Rates & Gathering Charges, 272 I.C.C. 375 (1948); Minnelusa 
Oil Corp., 258 I.C.C. 41 (1944); Petroleum Rail Shippers’ Ass’n v. Alton & So. R.R., 243 I.C.C. 
589 (1941); Reduced Pipe Line Rates & Gathering Charges, 243 I.C.C. 115 (1940). 
168.  169 U.S. 466 (1898); see id. at 546–47 (requiring the rate base to reflect the “fair 
value” of utility property dedicated to public service). 
169.  Farmers Union Cent. Exch. v. FERC, 584 F.2d 408, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 995 (1978). 
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Court’s 1944 overruling of Smyth in Hope Natural Gas,170 the ICC never 
updated its ratemaking methodology for oil pipelines.171 
Upon the transfer of ratemaking authority from the ICC to FERC in 
1977172 and a petition for review of a contested ICC rate order,173 the D.C. 
Circuit found “little to rely on in constructing a theory of oil pipeline 
ratemaking.”174  Taking special pains to identify “important economic 
transformations” as well as “the significant changes in the relevant legal 
environment since the ICC’s 1940’s decisions,”175 especially the rise of an 
“inflationary economy wherein [regulatory] valuation typically exceeds 
investment by a substantial amount,”176 the D.C. Circuit remanded the 
case to FERC so that the newly empowered agency could determine its 
own ratemaking methodology free of the ICC’s discredited precedent.177 
On remand, however, FERC set price ceilings so high that, even by 
the agency’s admission, they would “seldom [be] reached in actual 
practice” and would allow oil pipelines to achieve “creamy returns.”178  
Holding that FERC’s proposed methodology would flunk even the most 
generously framed interpretation of the responsibility to set “just and 
reasonable” rates,179 the D.C. Circuit vacated FERC’s rate order by 
stating: “FERC set rate ceilings which, if reached in practice, would 
admittedly be egregiously extortionate and then failed to demonstrate 
that market forces could be relied upon to keep prices at reasonable levels 
throughout the oil pipeline industry.”180  The Oil Pipe Lines trilogy took 
place against this backdrop. 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992181 directed FERC to adopt streamlined 
procedures for setting oil pipeline rates.182  To comply with this mandate, 
FERC adopted rates approved in the 1992 Act as a baseline for price-
level regulation and set caps for future rate increases according to an 
 
170.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944). 
171.  Farmers Union, 584 F.2d at 414. 
172.  See Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(b), 91 Stat. 
565, 584 (1977), recodified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 60502 (2012). 
173.  See Williams Bros. Pipe Line Co., 355 I.C.C. 479 (1976). 
174.  Farmers Union, 584 F.2d at 413. 
175.  Id. at 414. 
176.  Id. at 415. 
177.  See id. at 422. 
178.  Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
179.  Id. at 1510. 
180.  Id. 
181.  Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776. 
182.  See id. §§ 1801–04, 106 Stat. at 3010–12, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172 note (2012) (Oil 
Pipeline Regulatory Reform). 
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inflation index.183  This set the stage in 1996 for the first of two D.C. 
Circuit cases styled Ass’n of Oil Pipe Lines v. FERC (Oil Pipe Lines I).184  
The court of appeals characterized FERC’s “indexed ratemaking 
methodology” as one that would “enable pipelines to recover costs 
by . . . rais[ing] rates at the same pace as they are predicted to experience 
cost increases.”185 
“Of central importance to the Commission’s scheme [was] its choice 
of index.”186  Oil Pipe Lines I asked whether FERC’s oil pipeline rates 
should have hinged on a narrow producer price index or, alternatively, on 
a broader measure of prices throughout the economy of the United 
States.187  The pipeline industry proposed the implicit price deflator 
derived from the gross domestic product, which the D.C. Circuit 
(correctly) described as “a macroeconomic indicator of overall inflation 
in the economy.”188 
FERC countered with what it called “PPI – 1%,” the producer price 
index minus one percent.189  FERC derived this index from “a 
macroeconomic measure of inflation” by using “a fixed-weight index of 
commodity prices taken at the producer level” to track “price changes for 
commodities that will not undergo further processing.”190  Although 
FERC staff originally characterized the adoption of “an index one 
percent lower than the PPI as ‘an offset for productivity,’” the D.C. 
Circuit ultimately upheld the lowered index as “the most likely formula 
to keep rates at their real value.”191  “[E]mpirical evidence in the record,” 
said the reviewing court, “demonstrates that the application of the 
PPI – 1% to the total pipeline rate . . . was a better historical measure of 
pipelines’ cost experience” than other alternatives before FERC.192  The 
ratemaking dispute in Oil Pipe Lines I thus centered on the choice 
between a narrower producer price index and the broader implicit price 
deflator.193 
 
183.  See Order No. 561, Revisions to Oil Pipeline Regulations Pursuant to the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992, 58 Fed. Reg. 58,753 (Nov. 4, 1993), on reh’g sub nom. Order No. 561-A, 59 
Fed. Reg. 40,243 (Aug. 8, 1994). 
184.  83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
185.  Id. at 1430. 
186.  Id. 
187.  See id. at 1430 n.9; 1430 n.10. 
188.  Id. at 1430 & n.10. 
189.  Id. at 1430. 
190.  Id. at 1430 & n.9. 
191.  Id. at 1435. 
192.  Id. at 1436. 
193.  See id. at 1430 nn.9–10. 
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The commission rejected the implicit price deflator principally 
because of its breadth.194  The “GDP-IPD index,” it alleged, “directly 
reflects rapid inflation in consumer services, such as health care,” which 
oil pipelines buy “only indirectly, if at all.”195  Moreover, because the 
implicit price deflator “reflects changes in the composition of the GDP at 
large,” FERC complained that this index “is upwardly biased due to the 
growing size of inflationary sectors of the economy,” especially health 
care.196  The D.C. Circuit agreed.197  According to the court, the IPD’s 
fatal flaw lay in the “fact that the [index] reflects changes in the relative 
weights of different sectors of the economy,” which renders that index 
“less accurate for cost changes within a single industry.”198 
The court also took pains to distinguish FERC’s embrace of a PPI-
based index from the commission’s earlier deployment of a broader 
implicit price deflator in Buckeye Pipe Line Co.199  Buckeye had approved 
an experimental program under which a pipeline would be relieved of 
regulatory supervision of rates in markets where it lacked market power, 
as long as prices charged did “not exceed[] the change in the GNP 
deflator” since the rate was last increased, “plus two percent.”200  In other 
words, Buckeye upheld the use of a GNP deflator + 2% price cap.  If we 
treat the GNP deflator as a measure of inflation, as the BEA did before 
1991, Buckeye may be read as adopting an x-factor of minus 2%.  
Confining Buckeye to the circumstances of “a pipeline without market 
power,” the D.C. Circuit declined to allow that decision to impugn 
FERC’s “different purpose[s]” in adopting “the indexing rate cap” at 
issue in Oil Pipe Lines I.201 
There is reason to believe that Oil Pipe Lines I misconstrued the 
meaning of Buckeye.  By endorsing a pricing experiment in Buckeye, 
FERC moved toward deregulation before the passage of the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992.202  In the oil pipeline and wholesale electricity markets, 
FERC had begun to relax conventional rate-of-return regulation 
 
194.  See id. at 1434. 
195.  Id. 
196.  Id. 
197.  Id. at 1435. 
198.  Id.  
199.  53 FERC ¶ 61,473 (1990), on reh’g, 55 FERC ¶ 61,084 (1991). 
200.  55 FERC ¶ 61,084.  Buckeye and Oil Pipe Lines I took place on either side of the 
United States’ decision to switch from Gross National Product to Gross Domestic Product as 
its primary measure of national production.  See generally supra Part IV and text accompanying 
notes 114–18. 
201.  Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d at 1436. 
202.  53 FERC ¶ 61,473 (1990), on reh’g, 55 FERC ¶ 61,084, 61,255 (1991). 
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whenever a regulated firm could demonstrate the absence of market 
power.203  By 1990, in the bulk electricity market, FERC had already 
taken the more aggressive step of permitting purely market-based 
prices.204  After the passage of the 1992 Act, FERC gradually adopted 
market-based sales as a general policy in its regulation of wholesale 
electricity markets.205  The presence of a price cap of any sort in Buckeye 
suggests that FERC’s reform of oil pipeline regulation was conservative 
relative to the agency’s revision of its approach to the electricity market. 
Strictly as a matter of ratepayer protection, it is easy to understand 
why the D.C. Circuit endorsed PPI – 1%.206  FERC chose an index that 
would keep a tighter rein on oil pipeline rates.207  The Producer Price 
Index appears to rise more slowly than either the IPD or the Consumer 
Price Index for All Urban Consumers (CPI-U), two broader indexes that 
are alleged to be “upwardly biased due to the growing size of inflationary 
sectors of the economy.”208  A quick look at price index reports compiled 
by the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis and the 
Department of Labor’s BLS provides some hints supporting Oil Pipe 
Lines I’s decision to affirm FERC’s PPI – 1% methodology. 
Average annual change in any index may be computed according to 
the following formula: 
 
 
 
  
 
where x represents the index value and subscripts t and b indicate, 
respectively, the target and base years.209  From 1984 to 1996, the dozen 
years between Farmers Union II and Oil Pipe Lines I in which the D.C. 
Circuit gave FERC a second chance to devise a ratemaking methodology 
for oil pipelines, general inflation outpaced the Producer Price Index-
Finished Goods (the baseline in FERC’s PPI – 1% price cap) by almost 
exactly 0.75% per year, 2.738% to 1.986%210: 
 
203.  Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d at 1431. 
204.  See Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., Inc., 51 FERC ¶ 61,367 (1990). 
205.  See La. Energy & Power Auth. v. FERC, 141 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
206.  See Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424. 
207.  Id. at 1434. 
208.  Id. 
209.  See Chen, supra note 98, at 10. 
210.  All data analyzed in this paragraph and Table 1 are readily available online from 
government sources.  The Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov, reports the 
implicit price deflator of the gross domestic product as part of its tables on National Income 
x  xt
xb
tb 1  xt
xb


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
1
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Table 1: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator with the Producer Price 
Index, 1984–1996 
Year GDP-IPD PPI-FG 
1984 55.466 103.7 
1985 57.240 104.7 
1986 58.395 103.2 
1987 59.885 105.4 
1988 61.982 108.0 
1989 64.392 113.6 
1990 66.773 119.2 
1991 68.996 121.7 
1992 70.569 123.2 
1993 72.248 124.7 
1994 73.785 125.5 
1995 75.324 127.9 
1996 76.699 131.3 
Average Growth 2.738% 1.986% 
A graphical presentation of this information shows how the slope of 
the blue line, representing the implicit price deflator from 1984 to 1996, 
rose more steeply than the red line, which represents the PPI-Finished 
Goods index over the same period: 
Graph 1: GPD-IPD Versus PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–1996 
 
and Product Accounts.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics, http://www.bls.gov, reports the 
Consumer Price Index and Producer Price Index. 
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But the law does not allow regulators to shove rates downward simply 
because they can.  “[T]he principle that ‘lower is better,’” when presented 
as “an argument that seems to have no end and little connection to any 
stated purpose,” provides no basis for affirming a ratemaking decision.211  
If regulators can be required (as they are) to justify any particular x-factor 
as an “appropriate rate reduction measure,”212 then reviewing courts can 
and should demand no less rationality in the choice of an inflation index. 
2. Zwischenzug: United States Telephone Association 
Three years after Oil Pipe Lines I, the D.C. Circuit more directly 
confronted issues of indexing and x-factor computation, albeit in the 
context of telephone rate regulation.213  In United States Telephone Ass’n 
v. FCC (USTA),214 the D.C. Circuit reviewed a price cap that the FCC had 
imposed on local exchange companies (LECs).215  The FCC computed the 
x-factor “as the sum of the difference in productivity growth and the 
difference in input price growth between the LECs and the economy as a 
whole.”216  The FCC expected the x-factor to “provide a reliable measure 
of the extent to which changes in the LECs’ unit costs have been less than 
the change in level of inflation.”217 
The D.C. Circuit translated the FCC’s approach into mathematical 
terms: “X = U – L, where U is the ‘change in level of inflation,’ and L is 
the change in the LECs’ unit costs.”218  Unit costs, whether realized within 
a regulated firm or in the economy at large, change according to two 
factors: changes in productivity and changes in input prices.219  Therefore, 
L is readily conceptualized through the equation, “L = Δ% LEC input 
price – Δ% LEC productivity.”220  Treating “‘change[s] in unit costs in the 
economy as a whole’” as changes attributable to inflation yields a similar 
expression for U: “U = Δ% U.S. input price - Δ% U.S. productivity.”221  
“Substituting these values into the equation X = U – L, using ‘TFP’ for 
 
211.  Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
212.  Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 265 F.3d 313, 329 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 535 U.S. 986 (2002). 
213.  188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
214.  Id.  
215.  Id. 
216.  Id. at 524. 
217.  Id. at 524 n.1. 
218.  Id. at 524–25 n.1. (citation omitted). 
219.  See id. at 525 n.1.  
220.  Id.  
221.  Id. 
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productivity, and performing a little algebraic manipulation”222 of these 
definitions of U and L yields two alternative ways of stating the X-factor:
 
X = (Δ% LEC productivity – Δ% U.S. productivity) + (Δ% U.S. 
input prices – Δ% LEC input prices) 
X = (Δ% LEC productivity – Δ% LEC input prices) – (Δ% U.S. 
productivity – Δ% U.S. input prices)223
 
Each of these equations calculates the x-factor according to some 
relationship between industry-specific and economy-wide factors.  The 
first equation defines x as the sum of (1) the difference between industry-
specific and economy-wide productivity and (2) the difference between 
economy-wide and industry-specific input prices.224  The second formula, 
which the D.C. Circuit thought “more readily conceptualized,”225 defines 
x as the extent by which industry-specific growth in productivity, relative 
to growth in input prices, exceeds the extent to which economy-wide 
growth outpaces economy-wide growth in input prices.226 
But the court’s most provocative suggestion, by far, arose in its 
consideration of the x-factor in light of the price cap’s simultaneous 
consideration of inflation.227  Insofar as the FCC “also increase[d] the 
cap” at issue in USTA “by general price inflation,” the combination of an 
inflation-adjusted price cap and a productivity-sensitive x-factor 
effectively “increase[d] the cap by the LECs’ estimated change in unit 
costs.”228  Once a downwardly oriented x-factor is combined with a 
generally upward adjustment for inflation, the approximate “net effect of 
these adjustments is . . . to increase the cap by the LECs’ estimated cost 
in unit costs.”229  As the D.C. Circuit concluded in USTA, “[i]t is 
somewhat as if the overall adjustment (‘A’) were . . . A = U – X = U – (U 
– L) = L.”230  Substituting the previous definition for L and combining it 
with our original algebraic definition of price-level regulation231 allows us 
 
222.  Id. 
223.  See id. at 524–25. 
224.  Id. 
225.  Id. at 525. 
226.  Id. at 524. 
227.  Id. at 525 n.1. 
228.  Id. 
229.  Id. 
230.  Id. 
231.  See supra text following note 67. 
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to state the overall task of price-level regulation in extremely simple 
terms:
 
P1 = Pb  (1 + Δ% utility input prices – Δ% utility productivity) 
Or more generally:
 
Pt = Pb  (1 + Δ% utility input prices – Δ% utility productivity)t 
And most simply of all:
 
Pt = Pb  (1 + L)t 
To recast this final equation with a variable that does not reek of local 
exchange companies and telecommunications law, I have taken refuge in 
the Greek language.  The obvious English letter, i, is fraught with 
mathematical and economic meanings (respectively, the imaginary 
square root of –1 and a variable that either counts items in a sequence or 
representings the rate of interest).  The Greek words ενέργεια (literally, 
energy)232 and είσοδος (entrance)233 are often used to express the economic 
notion of input.234  The letter epsilon, ε, has the unfortunate distinction of 
designating errors or residuals in many mathematical specifications and 
may not be ideally suited for indicating growth in a regulated industry’s 
input costs. The most common Greek words designating industry, 
βιομηχανία and κλάδου,235 seem more promising.  Interestingly, both of 
these words are evocative of life.  English is filled with loanwords 
incorporating the Greek root bio-, and the word clade designates a group 
of living organisms characterized by some set of traits presumably 
inherited from a common ancestor.  Since beta, a measurement of 
covariance in mathematical finance,236 will actually make an appearance 
in this Article, I will settle for kappa, the first letter of κλάδου. 
Therefore, once again: 
Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t 
 
232.  Energy, THE CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY: GREEK-ENGLISH AND ENGLISH-
GREEK (George Ricker Berry ed., 16th prtg. 1962) [hereinafter THE CLASSIC GREEK 
DICTIONARY]. 
233.  Entrance, THE CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 232. 
234.  See, e.g., Translate Input to Greek, BABYLON, 
http://translation.babylon.com/english/to-greek/input/ [https://perma.cc/ETL2-RBYU] (last 
visited June 18, 2016). 
235.  βιομηχανία, from the Greek βιο (“life”) and μηχανία (“machine”), Life & Machine, 
THE CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 232; κλάδου (lit. “branch”), Branch, THE 
CLASSIC GREEK DICTIONARY, supra note 232.  
236.  See, e.g., infra Part VI.B. 
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where κ represents the rate of change in input prices paid by a regulated 
industry.  Even more generally, so that we can relax the unrealistic 
assumption that the rate of change in input prices would remain constant 
over a stretch of time: 
Pt  Pb  (1 i)
ib
t  
The power of this conclusion bears close notice.  A price cap adjusted 
exclusively for changes in input prices paid by regulated firms would 
operate exactly as a price cap that reflects separate adjustments for 
general changes in prices throughout the economy and for productivity 
growth within the regulated industry itself.  Calibrating price-level 
regulation solely according to changes in input costs borne by regulated 
firms could eliminate what has been to date the unwieldy task of 
computing an x-factor distinct from measures of price change, on either 
an economy-wide or industry-specific basis.  In other words, FERC’s 
adoption of PPI – 1% in Oil Pipe Lines I came dangerously close to 
regulatory brilliance, even though neither FERC nor its reviewing court 
defended the PPI – 1% index as a productivity offset,237 much less by 
reference to the conventional formula for price-level regulation. 
3. Oil Pipe Lines II 
FERC freely admitted that the methodology approved in Oil Pipe 
Lines I was “not a choice for all time” and promised to “monitor the 
index’s ability to track changes in pipeline costs and review the 
appropriateness of its choice of index . . . every five years.”238  After 
FERC’s first five-year review in 2000, it elected to adhere to the PPI – 1% 
index.239  The Association of Oil Pipe Lines filed a new challenge to 
FERC’s price ceiling.240 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in Oil Pipe Lines II affirmed one crucial 
aspect of FERC’s 2000 order and remanded the rest of the order for 
clarification of its economic methodology.241  In measuring “actual cost 
changes experienced by the oil pipeline industry,” FERC used a poorly 
specified “floating-weight” methodology that combined the simple 
 
237.  See Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
238.  Id. at 1430. 
239.  Order Concluding Initial Five-Year Review of the Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 93 
FERC ¶ 61,266 (2000). 
240.  Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
241.  See id. 
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average of pipeline costs per barrel-mile, the volume-weighted average of 
those costs, and the median of the pipeline cost distribution.242  Whatever 
market-based justification FERC might have had for eschewing the 
volume-weighted average of pipeline costs (the benchmark preferred by 
the industry) was undermined by the agency’s failure to account for the 
presence of distinct high-cost crude oil pipelines and lower cost “product” 
pipelines carrying refined products.243  FERC could not articulate 
rationales beyond unsupported desires to “create[] cost-controlling 
incentives” and to lower rates, even to the point of pushing pipelines to 
“imminent bankruptcy.”244 
Although the court hinted that FERC might have been able to justify 
its rejection of the pipelines’ preferred methodology on the basis of the 
standard econometric critique that fixed-weight indexing ignores 
substitution effects and overstates inflation,245 the court concluded that 
FERC had “not actually rest[ed] its decision” on such a rationale.246  Oil 
Pipe Lines II remanded for a full explanation of FERC’s cost 
measurements, as well as the agency’s refusal to remove statistical 
outliers and its unexplained abandonment of the use of net plant to 
calculate return on investment and income taxes in the computation of 
pipelines’ capital costs.247 
Critically, however, Oil Pipe Lines II affirmed FERC’s decision to 
retain its PPI – 1% indexing methodology.248  The Association of Oil Pipe 
Lines proposed two adjustments that had the potential to “undermine the 
case for PPI – 1.”249  First, the pipelines argued that the PPI – 1% ceiling 
had been so successful in improving the entire industry’s productivity that 
“any modeling of future costs” by FERC “should control for” the 
 
242.  Id. at 241–42. 
243.  See id. at 243. 
244.  Id. at 244. 
245.  Id. at 244–45. 
246.  Id.  For standard explanations of the vulnerability of fixed-weight price indexes to 
consumer substitution of cheaper for more expensive goods and services, see Marilyn E. 
Manser & Richard J. McDonald, An Analysis of Substitution Bias in Measuring Inflation, 1959–
85, 56 ECONOMETRICA 909 (1988); Jack E. Triplett, Economic Theory and BEA’s Alternative 
Quantity and Price Indexes, 72 SURV. CURRENT BUS., April 1992, at 49, 49–50; Allan H. Young, 
Alternative Measures of Change in Real Output and Prices, 72 SURV. CURRENT BUS., April 
1992, at 32, 35. 
247.  See Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 245–48; cf. Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 
1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (observing that a reviewing court “cannot substitute [its] views on 
statistics (including skewed data and outlier analysis) for those of” an expert agency “and insist 
that one measure or another be used”). 
248.  Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 248. 
249.  Id. at 247. 
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“onetime cost savings” attributable to the introduction of price-level 
regulation.250  Second, the pipelines proposed that FERC be required to 
account “for anticipated future cost increases due to increased 
environmental and safety regulations.”251 
The D.C. Circuit rebuffed both adjustments.252  The court reasoned 
that these proposals “essentially require FERC to perform the same 
task—to predict how future cost changes may deviate from the historical 
trend.”253  The court applauded FERC’s “refus[al] to engage in such 
speculation.”254  In the court’s view, FERC had adopted “a purely 
historical analysis and . . . adhered to it” in order to avoid “embroil[ing] 
itself in the complexity and iffiness” of a “forward-looking 
methodology.”255 
In affirming FERC’s adherence to PPI – 1%, Oil Pipe Lines II took 
special pains to distinguish the agency’s purely historical methodology 
from the speculative “consumer productivity dividend” that the D.C. 
Circuit rejected in United States Telephone Ass’n.256  Oil Pipe Lines II 
endorsed FERC’s defense of PPI – 1% as coming the “closest of all the 
indices considered . . . to tracking the historical changes in the actual costs 
of the product pipeline industry.”257  The court contrasted this 
justification for PPI – 1% with the 0.5% consumer productivity dividend 
that USTA vacated.258  “We found unexplained” the FCC’s decision to 
continue “lopp[ing] 0.5% off the historic trend line in anticipation of 
special productivity gains expected to flow from the switch to rate caps,” 
reasoned the court in Oil Pipe Lines II, “as the benefits of the one-time 
shift could hardly be expected to go on forever.”259 
A superficial reading of Oil Pipe Lines II suggests that the D.C. 
Circuit disavowed its own evaluation of the FCC’s x-factor calculation in 
USTA.  But in reality Oil Pipe Lines II did no such thing.  The D.C. 
Circuit’s second encounter with FERC’s price cap for oil pipelines 
established two principles.  First, Oil Pipe Lines II confirmed the 
characterization in Oil Pipe Lines I of PPI – 1% as a purely historical 
 
250.  Id. 
251.  Id. 
252.  Id. 
253.  Id. 
254.  Id. 
255.  Id. 
256.  Id. 
257.  Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
258.  Id. (citing USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
259.  Id. (citing USTA, 188 F.3d at 527). 
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methodology, with no pretense to adjusting rates for productivity gains 
within the pipeline industry.260 
Second, and more important, Oil Pipe Lines II distinguished 
PPI – 1% from the ill-fated consumer productivity dividend that failed to 
survive review in USTA.261  Even though the FCC described the 0.5% 
consumer productivity dividend as a component of its x-factor, that 
adjustment is more properly evaluated as a z-factor element of price-level 
regulation.262  Any adjustment purporting to reflect gains from price-level 
regulation rather than economic changes endogenous to the regulated 
industry should be attributed to the regulators themselves, and not to the 
industry or any individual firm.  That is the classic distinction between a 
z-factor and an x-factor.263  As USTA recognized, purported gains from 
regulatory transitions are just that—transitory—and should not be 
incorporated, whatever its nomenclature, into the productivity-based, 
technology-forcing component of price-level regulation. 
4. Flying J and Its Aftermath 
On remand from Oil Pipe Lines II, FERC revisited the cost 
computation, outlier, and net plant accounting issues that the D.C. Circuit 
had questioned.264  In Flying J Inc. v. FERC,265 the third and final 
installment of the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy, FERC abandoned all of those 
contested elements of its 2000 rate order.266  Indeed, to the chagrin of 
shippers who thought that a defense of those “innovations following 
remand” would have enabled FERC to retain “a price-cap index of 
PPI – 1,”267 FERC “chose an index of plain PPI.”268 
Flying J hinted that FERC’s indexing methodology might have been 
vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks.  But the reviewing court did no 
more than taunt the shippers for failing to articulate or press more 
effective economic arguments.269  It expressed bemusement that “no one 
in the current litigation seems to advocate use of an index differing from 
 
260.  Id. 
261.  Id. 
262.  See supra text accompanying notes 165–75. 
263.  See supra Part III.B. 
264.  Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495, 497–99 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
265.  363 F.3d 495. 
266.  Id. at 497. 
267.  Id. at 498. 
268.  Id. at 497. 
269.  Id. at 498. 
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PPI by fractions of a whole number.”270  Having invited either the agency 
or an interested party in Oil Pipe Lines II to argue “that a fixed-weight 
index is inferior to its floating-weight analog because the former fails to 
account for substitution from high-priced to low-price [sic] goods over 
time,”271 the D.C. Circuit in Flying J declined to address the issue on the 
paper-thin rationale that the shippers had failed to raise the point on 
appeal, despite having “raised the point before FERC on remand.”272 
Finally, the court revealed its awareness of “an issue that is inherent 
in cost and price indices.”273  The shippers complained that FERC had 
chosen to base its index on oil pipeline volumes for 1994 rather than 
1999.274  “At the heart” of this dispute, observed the court, lay “the 
difference between the Laspeyres and Paasche methods” of indexing, 
“with the former weighting elements on the basis of their share of the 
total in the initial period, and the latter assigning weights based on end-
period shares.”275  The court acknowledged that “the Laspeyres index 
tends to overstate . . . change” in quantities or prices “and acts as an 
upper bound on the actual rate of change.”276  A Laspeyres index’s 
retention of “the original weights . . . tends to conceal the extent to which 
customers have . . . substitut[ed] away from goods with rising relative 
prices towards those with declining relative prices.”277  By contrast, the 
Paasche index “serves as a lower bound.”278  Observing that “the shippers’ 
perfectly orthodox critique of an initial-period index” had been “matched 
by the equally orthodox critique of and end-period index,” the court 
declined to declare “any of FERC’s methodological choices” to be 
“erroneous and harmful.”279 
In a parting shot at what it must have perceived as the petitioning 
shippers’ lack of economic thoroughness, the court did observe that “[n]o 
one appears to have advocated year-by-year weighting, which tends to 
 
270.  Id. 
271.  Id. 
272.  Id. 
273.  Id. at 499. 
274.  Id. 
275.  Id.  For a comparison of Laspeyres and Paasche indexes, see Young, supra note 246, 
at 33, 42–43. 
276.  Flying J, 363 F.3d at 500. 
277.  Id. (citing PETER RICHARD GRENVILLE LAYARD & ALAN A. WALTERS, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 157 (1978)); cf. Steven D. Braithwait, The Substitution Bias of the 
Laspeyres Price Index: An Analysis Using Estimated Cost-of-Living Indexes, 70 AM. ECON. 
REV. 64 (1980). 
278.  Flying J, 363 F.3d at 500. 
279.  Id. 
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split the difference” between the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.280  
Although the court did not elaborate further, there is a deep economic 
literature on the development of chain-type, “ideal” indexes based on the 
geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes.281 
FERC’s price cap decisions since Flying J—indeed, since the 
beginning of the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy—have marked a steady retreat in 
the stringency of the agency’s regulation of oil pipeline rates.282  To this 
day, FERC pegs oil pipeline price caps to the Producer Price Index for 
Finished Goods.283  After surrendering any claim that its original 
PPI – 1% standard in Oil Pipe Lines I included a productivity 
component,284 FERC in Oil Pipe Lines II confirmed the purely historical 
ambitions of its PPI – 1% cap.285  Flying J upheld FERC’s retreat to PPI 
simpliciter.286  In the five-year review cycle immediately following Flying 
J, FERC reset its oil pipeline pricing index at PPI + 1.3%.287  FERC’s 
current cap rests at PPI + 2.65%.288  True to the notion that a price cap 
should apply across an entire industry, FERC has declined “to inquire 
into the particular circumstances of every pipeline and selectively remove 
pipelines that experienced cost changes due to one particular factor from 
the data set used to calculate the index.”289  At the same time, despite the 
 
280.  Id. 
281.  See generally, e.g., IRVING FISHER, THE MAKING OF INDEX NUMBERS (1922); 
Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen & W. Erwin Diewert, The Economic Theory of 
Indexed Numbers and the Measurement of Input, Output, and Productivity, 50 ECONOMETRICA 
1393 (1982); W. Erwin Diewert, Exact and Superlative Index Numbers, 46 J. ECONOMETRICS 
115 (1976).  For an application of this debate to the determination of the x-factor in price-level 
regulation, see Makholm, supra note 67, at 99–101.  For an application of “a geometric mean 
[to] exclude[] statistical outliers” in lieu of “an arithmetic mean (which does not exclude 
outliers)” in an administrative law setting, Colo. Wild v. U.S. Forest Serv., 435 F.3d 1204, 1215 
(10th Cir. 2006), see generally Am. Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 939 F.2d 975, 990–91 (D.C. Cir. 
1991). 
282.  See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114 FERC ¶ 61,293 (2006). 
283.  See 18 C.F.R. § 342.3(d)(2) (2016). 
284.  Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424, 1435 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
285.  Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
286.  Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495, 497, 500 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
287.  See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114 FERC ¶ 61,293. 
288.  See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 133 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2010) (2010 
Index Review Order), reh’g denied, 135 FERC ¶ 61,172 (2011) (2011 Rehearing Denial); see also 
Notice of Annual Change in the Producer Price Index for Finished Goods, 147 FERC ¶ 61,125 
(2014) (directing pipelines to multiply their indexed ceiling levels for July 1, 2013, through June 
30, 2014, by 1.038858 to account for a rise in the PPI-FG index from 194.2 for 2012 to 196.6 for 
2013, inasmuch as 196.6 ÷ 194.2 + 0.0265 ≈ 1.038858). 
289.  See 2010 Index Review Order, 133 FERC at ¶ 62,260. 
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concerns articulated in Oil Pipe Lines II,290 FERC has never set separate 
caps for high-cost crude pipelines and low-cost product pipelines.291 
C. Oil and Water May Not Mix, but Pipelines Prices and 
Access Charges Do 
“And the end of all our exploring / Will be to arrive where we started 
/ And know the place for the first time.”292  This cycle of D.C. Circuit 
cases—a trilogy on FERC’s regulation of oil pipelines and an intervening 
decision on an FCC price cap on access charges—appears to have ended 
inauspiciously.  After being goaded into treating its newfound 
responsibility under the Hepburn Act and Energy Policy Act with some 
measure of seriousness, FERC retreated, from the inception of the Oil 
Pipe Lines trilogy and to the present day, from a PPI – 1% ceiling with 
abortive pretensions to the imposition of a productivity-based x-factor to 
a PPI + 2.65% factor evocative of the “creamy returns” that the D.C. 
Circuit refused to countenance in 1984.293  Along the way, Oil Pipe Lines 
II distanced FERC’s oil pipeline regime from the one opinion, United 
States Telephone Ass’n (USTA), that offered real promise for reform and 
streamlining price-level regulation. 
But we should not let the FCC’s misleading characterization of the 
consumer productivity dividend at issue in USTA conceal that decision’s 
enduring significance.  USTA declined to endorse the FCC’s indefinite 
inclusion of the consumer productivity dividend in the access charge price 
caps.294  Although the FCC had described the consumer productivity 
dividend as a component of the x-factor,295 closer examination confirms 
that this adjustment was more appropriately evaluated as a component of 
the parameter that the Commission’s own rules classify as a z-factor.  For 
of its tantalizing treatment of FERC’s PPI-based price caps, the Oil Pipe 
Line cases never disavowed USTA’s suggestion that price-level regulation 
may be conducted on the basis of a single index: changes in the input 
prices paid by a regulated industry.296  That suggestion, coupled with 
FERC’s enduring reliance on a variant of the Producer Price Index, 
 
290.  See Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 244. 
291.  See 2011 Rehearing Denial, 147 FERC at ¶ 62,024; 2010 Index Review Order, 133 
FERC at ¶ 62,267. 
292.  T.S. ELIOT, FOUR QUARTETS 59 (Esme Valerie Eliot ed., 1971). 
293.  Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1509 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
294.  USTA, 188 F.3d 521, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
295.  Id. at 524. 
296.  See generally Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Oil Pipe Lines II, 
281 F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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invites closer reevaluation of price-level regulation.  This Article now 
turns to that final task. 
VI. A STREAMLINED, SINGLE-INDEX APPROACH TO PRICE-LEVEL 
REGULATION 
A. Three, Two, One 
The full specification of price-level regulation adjusts a price cap 
according to a function of three parameters: the rate of economy-wide 
inflation (π), an x-factor reflecting industry-wide gains in total factor 
productivity, and a z-factor reflecting efficiency gains to the adoption of 
price-level regulation: 
Pt = Pb  (1 + π – x – z)t 
The withering away of z-factor adjustments after an initial transition 
reduces price-level regulation to a simpler two-parameter specification:  
Pt = Pb · (1 + π – x)t 
The Oil Pipe Lines trilogy demonstrated that the inflation index need 
not be one reflecting price change in the economy at large (the implicit 
price deflator of the GDP) or even price change in a market basket of 
consumer goods and services (CPI), but rather a producer-oriented index 
such as PPI.297  United States Telephone Ass’n showed that the difference 
between a general measure of inflation and an adjustment for total factor 
productivity within an industry is equivalent to an index of input costs for 
that industry.298  π – x = κ, as it were.  This matched pair of insights reduces 
price-level regulation to a single-parameter exercise: 
Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t  
where κ represents the rate of change in input prices borne by a regulated 
industry.  Even more generally: 
Pt  Pb  (1 i)
ib
t  
Decided at the end of the United States’ first decade of experience 
with price-level regulation, USTA simplifies this legal chore in yet 
another way.  USTA demonstrated that z-factor adjustments are 
 
297.  See supra Part V.B.4. 
298.  USTA, 188 F.3d at 524. 
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irrelevant to economic conditions outside a regulatory agency and are 
legally unsustainable beyond the initial transition from conventional cost-
of-service ratemaking.299  Elimination of z-factor adjustments reduces 
price-level regulation to a binary choice.300  Regulators may continue to 
adhere to the prescription that American authorities have endorsed for 
the past quarter-century.301  That approach requires the choice of an 
inflation index, followed by the careful determination of an x-factor.302 
A formulaic alternative, which this Article has defended on the 
precedential strength of USTA and the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy, would 
collapse the choice of inflation index and the determination of the x-
factor into a single step: the application of an index of input costs borne 
by the regulated industry as a whole.303  Isolating a single, industry-
specific cost index demystifies a transitional regulatory reform that 
sometimes appears to have fallen victim to the name of its most distinctive 
step.  The x-factor remains mysterious in its origin and (judging by the 
protests lodged against regulatory agencies that have tried to fix its 
value)304 arbitrary in its ultimate determination and application. 
The traditional two-parameter specification does boast at least one 
countervailing virtue: Treating inflation and the x-factor as distinct 
adjustments reminds regulators that the economic fate of individual firms 
(including regulatory incentives to control costs and to innovate) lies two 
steps removed from a price cap.  To achieve any gains under price-level 
regulation, a firm must beat the rest of its industry, which cohort’s 
collective fate in turn depends on its relative position within the broader 
economy.  In other words, a firm wins under a price cap to the extent that 
it beats its competitors and to the extent that its industry beats the rest of 
the economy. 
Under the two-parameter, inflation-minus-x model of price-level 
regulation, the indisputable first step consists of choosing the broadest 
available inflation index.305  The primary virtue of a broader index of price 
change lies in its immunity from manipulation.  No monopolist, regardless 
of its size, can plausibly affect general price inflation throughout the 
United States economy.  A price cap’s ability to reduce or eliminate the 
 
299.  USTA, 188 F.3d 521.  
300.  See supra Part V.B.2–4. 
301.  See, e.g., Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
302.  See discussion supra Parts IV, V. 
303.  See supra Part V.B.2. 
304.  See, e.g., supra Part V.B (discussing the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy). 
305.  Vogelsang, supra note 145, at 9–10. 
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tendency of a regulated firm to be “dissuaded from cost cutting efforts” 
under conventional cost-of-service ratemaking depends heavily on the 
extent to which the cap is “disconnected from individual firm costs.”306  
The central goal of price-level regulation, after all, is to measure total 
factor productivity across an entire regulated industry, and emphatically 
not on a firm-specific basis.307  Adjusting rates according to an index of 
costs throughout the industry helps ensure that “no one [firm’s] cost 
experience has much impact on the caps to which it is subject.”308  
“[W]hereas fixing rate maximums on the basis of individual [firms’] costs” 
can deter regulated firms “from adopting cost-reducing innovations,” the 
“cost reduction” experience of any one firm under price-level regulation 
“is unlikely to much affect the industry-wide index.”309 
At the other extreme, it makes no sense whatsoever to set a price cap 
according to a measure chosen specifically for its ability to reflect 
individual firms’ costs.  At worst, calibrating price-level regulation 
according to the regulated firm’s actual costs or to some exogenous 
measure purporting to measure those costs comes perilously close to 
“permit[ting] [a] regulated compan[y] to select the rate of return index” 
that offers it the most generous rates.310 
Finally, using a broad measure of inflation discharges one of the core 
obligations of public utility law in any of its guises—the need to ensure a 
provider of infrastructure of an adequate return on investment.311  The 
reasonable, investment-backed expectations of public utility shareholders 
are based strictly on the opportunity cost of their investment in the 
regulated firm.312  Nothing in contemporary regulatory reform 
undermines the principle that a measure of general inflation is most 
appropriate for protecting the expectations of utility investors.313  “Any 
investor paying attention” to the evolving law of regulated industries 
must “realize that he [cannot] rely indefinitely on traditional regulatory 
 
306.  Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d 239, 244 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
307.  See Loube, supra note 145, at 289; Makholm, supra note 67, at 97. 
308.  Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 F.3d at 247. 
309.  Frontier Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 774, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
310.  Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
311.  See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944); Bluefield 
Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 679, 692-93 (1923); Chicago 
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 458 F.2d 731, 750–51 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1074 (1972). 
312.  See generally Jim Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1535, 1549–59 (1999) (debunking the notion that constitutional concepts such as the 
confiscatory ratemaking doctrine of Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), should provide 
additional checks against innovative deregulatory techniques). 
313.  Webb, supra note 125, at 847. 
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methods,” but must rather adjust to novel approaches.314  Because the 
“Constitution does not bind rate-making bodies to the service of any 
single formula or combination of formulas,”315 regulated firms “have no 
vested interest in any particular [ratemaking] calculation.”316  
Constitution and statutory ratemaking principles require that the 
regulatory “determination of fair prices” be “based on reasonable 
financial requirements of the industry.”317  Price-level regulation delivers 
at least that much. 
B. Beta, Data, PPI 
The foregoing intuitions suggest that FERC has implemented an 
administratively convenient but economically imperfect price-cap 
methodology by pegging oil pipeline rates to the Producer Price Index.  If 
the Oil Pipe Lines cases are interpreted as disputes over the inflationary 
component of a price cap, as opposed to the x-factor, then a casual critic 
may perceive grounds for complaint.  Basing a price cap on producer 
prices instead of general price inflation undermines the primary purpose 
of price-level regulation, which is to disentangle ratemaking from any 
individual firm’s costs.  To the extent that regulators rely on a price index 
within the economic sway of a sufficiently large monopolist, a 
coordinated group of firms, or even firms acting consciously in parallel,318 
price-level regulation loses some of its power to enhance each regulated 
firm’s incentive to cut costs and perhaps even to innovate. 
Economic redemption of the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy and FERC’s price 
caps, from the original PPI – 1% designation to their current PPI + 2.65% 
incarnation, lies in USTA’s insight that the residue of a general inflation 
index and an appropriate productivity offset for an industry is the rate of 
 
314.  Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 528 (2002) (describing regulatory 
discretion over rates as constrained solely by the “constitutional bar against confiscatory 
rates”). 
315.  Fed. Power Comm’n v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 586 (1942); accord 
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776–77 (1968) (“[R]ate-making agencies are not 
bound to the service of any single regulatory formula; they are permitted . . . to make the 
pragmatic adjustments which may be called for by particular circumstances.” (quotation 
omitted)). 
316.  Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
317.  Wisconsin v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 373 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1963); accord Duquesne 
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 315 (1989) (quoting Wisconsin v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 373 
U.S. at 299).   
318.  Cf., e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 549–50 (2007) (requiring more 
coordination than even “conscious parallelism” as the basis for a cause of action under § 1 of 
the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). 
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change in that industry’s input costs.319  Neither FERC’s pipeline pricing 
orders nor the D.C. Circuit’s opinions on review, standing on their own, 
support the synthesis of inflation and x-factor calculation into a single 
step.320  Under fire in Oil Pipe Lines I, FERC never again defended PPI-
based indexing on x-factor grounds,321 and the D.C. Circuit affirmatively 
upheld PPI – 1% as a strictly historical exercise.322 
Indeed, the econometric record since 1984—whether measured 
according to prices paid throughout the broader economy or according to 
prices received by domestic producers of finished goods—demonstrates 
that PPI-Finished Goods has come closer than even CPI-U, the BLS’ 
standard measure of inflation, to tracking the United States economy323: 
 
319.  See USTA, 188 F.3d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
320.  See, e.g., Flying J Inc. v. FERC, 363 F.3d 495 (D.C. Cir. 2004); Oil Pipe Lines II, 281 
F.3d 239 (D.C. Cir. 2002); USTA, 188 F.3d 521; Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
321.  See Oil Pipe Lines I, 83 F.3d 1424. 
322.  Id. at 1445. 
323.  See supra note 210. 
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Table 2: The Implicit Price Deflator, CPI-U, and 
PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–2013 
Year GDP-IPD CPI-U PPI-FG
1984 55.466 103.9 103.7 
1985 57.240 107.6 104.7 
1986 58.395 109.6 103.2 
1987 59.885 113.6 105.4 
1988 61.982 118.3 108.0 
1989 64.392 124.0 113.6 
1990 66.773 130.7 119.2 
1991 68.996 136.2 121.7 
1992 70.569 140.3 123.2 
1993 72.248 144.5 124.7 
1994 73.785 148.2 125.5 
1995 75.324 152.4 127.9 
1996 76.699 156.9 131.3 
1997 78.012 160.5 131.8 
1998 78.859 163.0 130.7 
1999 80.065 166.6 133.0 
2000 81.887 172.2 138.0 
2001 83.754 177.1 140.7 
2002 85.039 179.9 138.9 
2003 86.735 184.0 143.3 
2004 89.120 188.9 148.5 
2005 91.988 195.3 155.7 
2006 94.814 201.6 160.4 
2007 97.337 207.342 166.6 
2008 99.246 215.303 177.1 
2009 100.000 214.537 172.5 
2010 101.221 218.056 179.8 
2011 103.311 224.939 190.5 
2012 105.166 229.594 194.2 
2013 106.733 232.957 196.6 
Average Growth 2.283% 2.823% 2.230% 
Over this 29-year span, CPI-U grew at an annual rate of 2.823%, or 
0.54% more than the 2.283% growth rate in the implicit price deflator of 
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the GDP.324  That gap is a relatively modest reflection of much larger gaps 
between these inflation indexes, which I have estimated elsewhere as 
0.659% from 1974 to 2014325 and which the celebrated Boskin Report of 
1996 pegged between 0.80 and 1.60%.326  What is even more striking is the 
near equivalence of the IPD and PPI-FG.327  Both indexes, finished this 
three-decade stretch in a dead heat, at 2.283 and 2.230%, respectively.328  
Although the IPD outpaced the PPI-FG by roughly 0.75% a year from 
1984 to 1996, the PPI-FG all but closed that gap between 1997 and 2013.329 
The relationship among these indexes can be expressed in more 
formal statistical terms.  Pearson’s r is the standard measure of correlation 
between two sets of data.  When specified for an entire population rather 
than a sample, Pearson’s correlation coefficient is designated as x,y:  
x,y  cov(x,y) x y  
Beta is a measure of covariance.  For any two sets of data, represented by 
independent variable x and dependent variable y, beta for y is the ratio of 
the covariance between the two data sets to the variance of x330: 
y  cov(x,y)var(x) 
cov(x,y)
 x2  
The mathematical relationship between beta and Pearson’s correlation 
coefficient can be reduced to the verbal description of beta as “correlated 
relative volatility”: 
y  x,y
y  x y 
cov(x,y)
 x2 
 x
 y 
cov(x,y)
 x y  x,y
 
 
324.  See supra Table 2. 
325.  See Chen, supra note 98, at 9, 12. 
326.  See MICHAEL J. BOSKIN ET AL., COMM. ON FIN. U.S. SENATE, 104TH CONG., FINAL 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMISSION TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX (Comm. 
Print 1996), reprinted in GETTING PRICES RIGHT: THE DEBATE OVER THE CONSUMER PRICE 
INDEX 5, 20–64 (Dean Baker ed., 1998).  The advisory commission and its report were known 
by the name of the commission’s chairman, Michael J. Boskin. 
327.  See supra Table 2. 
328.  See supra Table 2.  
329.  See supra p. 962. 
330.  See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Marshall Blume, Measure of Portfolio Performance Under 
Uncertainty, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 565 (1970). 
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In this instance, because IPD as BEA data and CPI-U and PPI-FG as 
BLS data are reported according to differing scales, I rescaled IPD 
according to an imputed 1984 value of 103.8 (the arithmetic mean of CPI-
U and PPI-FG for that year) before calculating beta.  To wit: 
q  cov(
*,q)
var( *)  
where π* represents IPD as the best available measure of inflation, 
rescaled according to my best estimate of IPD’s value for 1984, and q 
represents the target index in question, either CPI-U or PPI-FG.  
The following table reports correlation coefficients and betas for CPI-
U and PPI-FG, relative to GDP-IPD, for the 1984 to 2013 test period:  
Table 3: Correlation and Beta for CPI-U and PPI-Finished 
Goods, Relative to the Implicit Price Deflator 
Target Index CPI-U PPI-FG
Pearson’s r 0.9996 0.9806
Estimated q 1.3171 0.9161
The very high correlation coefficients for both CPI-U and PPI-FG, 
relative to IPD, express the extremely close relationship among all three 
indexes.  Since CPI-U, unlike PPI-FG, purports to measure inflation, it 
should be unsurprising that Pearson’s r for CPI-U relative to IPD is 
relatively closer (by a tiny margin) than r for PPI-FG, and extremely close 
to 1 in absolute terms.  
Of greater interest is beta for each of these indexes.  Beta reveals how 
CPI-U and PPI-FG each covary with the implicit price deflator as the best 
available measure of inflation.  The beta for CPI-U, at 1.1912, very closely 
tracks the 16.5% gap between CPI-U and the IPD as measures of inflation 
from 1984 to 2013.  Beta for PPI-FG is nearly equal to 1.  That measure’s 
covariance with the IPD was nearly perfect. 
A graphical presentation of these three indexes provides even more 
vivid visual evidence of the relationships between them, especially the 
critical link between the IPD and PPI-FG: 
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Graph 2: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator, CPI-U, and  
PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–2013 
 
CPI and PPI data, both being products of the BLS, are reported on a 
scale where 100 designates their value in 1982.331  On the graph above, the 
BLS scale is reported on the left axis.  CPI-U, in red, and PPI-FG, in gold, 
are directly comparable.  In 1984, both of these BLS-reported indexes 
were close to their 1982 base value of 100.332  By 2013, the 18.3% gap 
between those indexes after twenty-nine years is readily apparent.333  As 
a product of the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the IPD is reported on a 
scale where 100 designates its value in 2009.334  That scale is reported on 
the right axis.335  The congruence between PPI-FG and the IPD is less 
apparent, but still may be perceived through the rough parallelism of the 
blue IPD line and the gold PPI-FG line. 
Indeed, replotting IPD for 1984 through 2013 on a 1984 base value of 
103.8 (halfway between that year’s value for CPI-U and PPI-FG) reveals 
not only the similar rate of growth in IPD and PPI-FG over those three 
decades, but also these indexes’ greater covariance: 
 
 
331.  See supra Graph 2. 
332.  See supra Table 3. 
333.  See supra Graph 2. 
334.  See supra Table 3. 
335.  See supra Graph 2. 
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Graph 3: A Normalized Comparison of the Implicit Price Deflator,  
CPI-U, and PPI-Finished Goods, 1984–2013 
It is now more visually apparent how CPI-U grew steadily larger than 
the IPD from 1984 to 2013, while PPI-FG fell behind the IPD in the first 
half of this period but caught up in the latter half.336  On the basis of this 
adjustment in the plotting of GDP-IPD data, I calculated betas for CPI-
U and PPI-FG relative to the IPD. 
Without truly intending any such revision of price-level regulation—
indeed, despite its affirmative disavowal of any intention beyond purely 
historical reporting of pipeline costs—FERC may have stumbled onto a 
price cap methodology that is as practically workable as it is theoretically 
sound.  The Oil Pipe Lines trilogy echoes one of the grandest cycles in the 
law of regulated industries.  The notorious “fair value” rule of Smyth v. 
Ames337 entitled a regulated firm to demand “a fair return upon the value 
of that which it employs for the public convenience.”338  Although “[i]n 
theory the . . . fair value standard mimics the operation of the competitive 
market,” inasmuch as “investments . . . [whose] benefits exceed their 
costs . . . reward[] [utilities] with an opportunity to earn an ‘above-cost’ 
 
336.  See supra Graph 2. 
337.  169 U.S. 466 (1898). 
338.  Id. at 547. 
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return,”339 practical difficulties plagued the valuation of property whose 
owners bear legal obligations unknown in other segments of the 
economy.340  The purely historical “prudent investment” rule arose as an 
economically deficient but administratively convenient alternative.341 
In its most recent pronouncement on the constitutional limits on rate 
regulation, the Supreme Court declined to demand “rigid [enforcement] 
of the prudent investment rule” and thereby “foreclose a return to some 
form of the fair value rule just as its practical problems may be 
diminishing.”342  In an age where secondary markets provide economic 
signals historically obscured by command-and-control regulation and 
overwhelming amounts of data are collected and distributed, the purely 
historical instinct underlying the prudent investment rule and the Oil Pipe 
Lines trilogy may and should give way to superior information and fully 
considered economic judgment. 
The availability and reliability of economic data needed to index price 
caps should dictate the path of reform in price-level regulation.  Theory 
leaves little doubt that producer cost information across the entirety of a 
regulated industry could facilitate a single-parameter, one-step approach 
to price-level regulation.  The practical question is whether any version 
of Producer Price Index data or any other index can facilitate single-
parameter price-level regulation. 
C. Chain-Type Price Indexes for Purchased Inputs by Industry 
The Producer Price Index and its variants provide a good starting 
point, though probably not a perfect solution.  The general PPI reported 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics would require two modifications before 
it could be used as a measure of industry-wide input costs.343  First, the 
PPI is designed to “measure[] average changes in prices received by 
domestic producers for their output,” not changes in prices paid by 
producers.344  Second, the relevant index would not be the main PPI, but 
a subindex tailored according to a specific industry.345  The historic depth 
 
339.  Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989). 
340.  See id. at 309. 
341.  See Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 291 (1923) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
342.  Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 316 n.10. 
343.  BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BLS HANDBOOK OF 
METHODS ch. 14, at 1 (June 2015) [BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 14], 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/pdf/homch14.pdf [https://perma.cc/XU3C-8DH6]. 
344.  Id. at 1. 
345.  Cf. id. at 4 (“A Producer Price Index for an industry is a measure of changes in prices 
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of the data may also be less than ideal.  For instance, BLS’s producer price 
index for telecommunications reaches back no further than 2003.346  
Nevertheless, the quest for price indexes that reflect conditions even in 
highly volatile industries such as information technology is at least as old 
as price-level regulation itself.347  The development of an index focusing 
solely on regulated firms’ input prices seems within the reach of a 
reasonably competent regulatory agency. 
Indeed, BLS’s counterpart within the Department of Commerce, the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, has devised chain-type price indexes for 
purchased service inputs across a wide range of industries.348  This is 
precisely the type of producer cost index that could provide the value of 
κ (or at least inform its computation) in a single-parameter, 
Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t approach to price-level regulation.  Among the industry-
specific input price indexes that the BEA has calculated, three are strong 
candidates for use in price-level regulation: “utilities,” “pipelines,” and 
“broadcasting and telecommunications.”  The following table reports 
BEA data, available since 1997, for those three industries and their 
relationship to the implicit price deflator of the GDP: 
 
received for the industry’s output sold outside the industry (i.e., its net output).”). 
346.  See id.  
347.  See, e.g., James Sinclair & Biran Catron, An Experimental Price Index for the 
Computer Industry, SURV. CURRENT BUS., Oct. 1990, at 16.   
348.  See BLS HANDBOOK OF METHODS, CHAPTER 14, supra note 343, at 9. 
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Table 4: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator with Industry-
Specific Price Indexes for Utilities, Pipelines, and 
Broadcasting/Telecommunications Companies, 1997–2013 
Year GDP-IPD Utilities Pipelines Broadcast/ 
Telecom 
1997 78.012 81.052 70.655 90.149 
1998 78.859 81.261 72.257 89.941 
1999 80.065 81.997 74.041 90.524 
2000 81.887 84.945 76.473 91.501 
2001 83.754 86.463 77.754 92.014 
2002 85.039 87.106 80.044 91.559 
2003 86.735 89.059 81.845 92.560 
2004 89.120 91.346 86.528 93.361 
2005 91.988 95.029 91.231 94.626 
2006 94.814 98.396 94.225 96.708 
2007 97.337 101.148 96.035 96.999 
2008 99.246 104.403 100.297 99.209 
2009 100.000 100.000 100.000 100.000 
2010 101.221 102.968 102.123 101.173 
2011 103.311 104.784 105.733 102.359 
2012 105.166 106.815 108.448 104.213 
2013 106.733 108.791 110.036 105.677 
Average 
Annual Growth 
1.978% 1.857% 2.807% 0.998% 
Implied x-factor 
= π – κ  0.122% -0.829% 0.980% 
Beta  0.9232 1.2868 0.4915 
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And in graphical form: 
Graph 4: Comparing the Implicit Price Deflator with Industry-Specific 
Price Indexes for Utilities, Pipelines, and 
Broadcasting/Telecommunications Companies, 1997–2013 
 
These indexes show that input costs borne by producers in the 
utilities, pipelines, and broadcasting and telecommunications industries 
varied widely from each other and, more to the point, from economy-
wide inflation from 1997 through 2013.349  The average annual rates of 
growth varied from a low of 0.998% in broadcast and telecommunications 
to a high of 2.807% for pipelines.350  Because a single agency, BEA, 
reports all of these indexes, they share a base year of 2009.351  The slope 
of each index’s curve in the graph above reveals the rate of growth.352  
And the relationship of each industry’s cost index to the IPD (indicated 
by the blue curve) is readily seen.353 
An industry-specific measure of input costs immediately reveals the 
x-factor that regulators would compute in a two-parameter version of 
price-level regulation.  Since κ = π – x, it follows that x = π – κ.  A slower 
rate of growth in input costs within an industry, such as broadcast and 
 
349.  See supra Table 4. 
350.  See supra Table 4. 
351.  See supra Table 4. 
352.  See supra Graph 3. 
353.  See supra Graph 3. 
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telecommunications, implies a relatively high x-factor.354  Had the FCC 
consulted BEA’s input cost index for broadcasting and 
telecommunications in any of its price cap proceedings, that index would 
have provided support for fixing the x-factor in the neighborhood of 1%.  
Industries influenced by Moore’s law should be dynamic355—and be 
assigned correspondingly aggressive x-factors reflecting their gains in 
total factor productivity. 
By contrast, if input costs are outpacing inflation, as they did for 
pipelines, the x-factor will be negative.356  BEA data suggest that the x-
factor for a price cap on pipelines from 1997 to 2013, a period roughly 
contemporaneous with the Oil Pipe Lines trilogy, should have been 
approximately –0.829%.357  Since PPI-FG has already been shown to 
closely track the IPD, a weighted average of FERC’s adjustments relative 
to PPI should approximate the x-factor latent in that agency’s oil pipeline 
price cap.358  From 1996 to 2002, FERC used PPI – 1%.  From 2002 to 
2006, PPI prevailed.359  FERC’s 2006 rate order adopted PPI + 1.3%;360 its 
2010 order has directed PPI + 2.65% ever since.361  A weighted average of 
those rates yields an implied x-factor of –0.544%.  The weighted average 
for the twelve years following Oil Pipe Lines II is –1.317%.  The x-factor 
implied by BEA data on pipeline input costs (–0.829%) falls comfortably 
between those two figures.  Although FERC and the D.C. Circuit would 
disavow the notion, the PPI-based price cap for oil pipelines has 
implemented—in practice if not in legal form—a negative x-factor 
commensurate with rising costs in that industry, particularly for crude oil 
transport.362 
Most intriguingly of all, perhaps, beta for each of the three industries 
corresponding to one of the BEA’s input cost indexes spans a range from 
0.4915 for broadcast and communications to 0.9232 for utilities and 1.2868 
for pipelines.363  Because IPD and the industry-specific input indexes are 
 
354.  See supra Table 4. 
355.  See generally Gordon E. Moore, Cramming More Components onto Integrated 
Circuits, ELECTRONICS MAG., Aug. 1965, at 4. 
356.  See supra Table 4. 
357.  See supra Table 4.  
358.  See supra Table 2. 
359.  See Five-Year Review of Oil Pipeline Pricing Index, 114 FERC ¶ 61,293 (2006). 
360.  See id. 
361.  See 2010 Index Review Order, 133 FERC ¶ 61,228 (2010), reh’g denied, 2011 
Rehearing Denial, 135 FERC ¶ 61,172 (2011); see also Notice of Annual Change in the 
Producer Price Index for Finished Goods, 147 FERC ¶ 61,125 (2014) 
362.  See supra Table 4. 
363.  See supra Table 4.  
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reported on the same scale, beta can be calculated straightforwardly as 
the ratio of (1) each index’s covariance relative to IPD to (2) the variance 
of the IPD.364  Greater input inflation in the pipeline industry corresponds 
not only with a negative x-factor for that industry, but also greater beta.365  
The reverse is true for broadcasting and telecommunications.366  
Unsurprisingly, the utilities category—presumably corresponding to 
electricity and water, commodities whose demand tends to rise and fall 
with the broader economy—represented the industrial clade whose costs 
most closely tracked the gross domestic product of the United States and 
whose beta was closest to unity.367 
Adoption of a single-parameter, Pt = Pb  (1 + κ)t approach has the 
final theoretical virtue of harmonizing price-level regulation with 
portfolio theory,368 particularly the capital asset pricing model that has 
proved so influential in the setting of rates of return (particularly return 
on equity) under conventional ratemaking.369  An early criticism of price-
level regulation alleged that price caps raised the betas of entire industries 
subjected to what, two or three decades ago, was a novel legal practice.370  
Studies conducted for the World Bank in the 1990s found that 
infrastructure firms subject to price caps had higher betas than their 
counterparts awarded a regulated rate of return.371  Higher beta, ceteris 
paribus, signals the need for a higher rate of return, especially on equity, 
to attract investment in a more volatile, presumably riskier company.372  
 
364.  For a specification of the formula for beta, see supra note 330. 
365.  See supra Table 4. 
366.  See supra Table 4.  
367.  See supra Table 4.  
368.  See generally JAMES MING CHEN, POSTMODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY: 
NAVIGATING ABNORMAL MARKETS AND INVESTOR BEHAVIOR (2016).  
369.  See, e.g., AEP Tex. N. Co. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 609 F.3d 432, 434–37, 439–44 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010); Connect Am. Fund, 28 FCC Rcd. 7123, 7146–69 (2013); Represcribing the 
Authorized Rate of Return for Interstate Servs. of Local Exch. Carriers, 5 FCCR 7507 (1990); 
A. Lawrence Kolbe, Michael J. Vilbert & Bente Villadsen, Measuring Return on Equity 
Correctly, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 1, 2005, at 23. 
370.  See Ian Alexander & Timothy Irwin, Price Caps, Rate-of-Return Regulation, and the 
Cost of Capital, VIEWPOINT (World Bank Grp., D.C.), Oct. 1996, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11604/multi_page.pdf?sequenc
e=1&isAllowed=y [https://perma.cc/2VZ4-HENZ]. 
371.  See id.; Ian Alexander, Colin Mayer & Helen Weeds, Regulatory Structure, Risk, and 
Infrastructure Firms: An International Comparison (World Bank Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. 1698 Nov. 30, 1999), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=620633 [https://perma.cc/9253-
6X94]. 
372.  See, e.g., Robert A. Korajczyk, Introduction to ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO 
PERFORMANCE: MODELS, STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE METRICS, at xiii, xv (Robert A. 
Korajczyk ed., 1999); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium 
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In price-level regulation, higher beta in input costs relative to the baseline 
of general inflation signals an industry whose costs are growing faster 
than those in other sectors of the economy,373 and therefore one that 
needs to charge higher prices to customers and to pay higher returns to 
investors in order to survive. 
The betas reported here are distinct from the stock market betas 
evaluated by the World Bank.  My relevant benchmark is neither the 
universe of publicly traded companies or the “investments in other 
business undertakings which are attended by . . . risks and uncertainties” 
comparable to public utility companies.374  Rather, I emphasize the 
relationship between the input costs in industries deemed suitable for 
price-level regulation and price change in the broader economy. 
In financial markets, beta provides the simplest measure of investment 
risk that cannot be managed by mere diversification.375  It is a measure of 
systematic risk.  In a two-stage process for setting a price cap, the x-factor 
serves the function of identifying the extent to which the regulated 
industry systematically differs from the broader economy.376  An industry-
specific index of input costs performs the same function, as one might 
expect of a parameter that is equivalent, conceptually if not exactly in 
practice, to a broad measure of inflation, minus total factor productivity 
unique to that industry.377 
After the application of either (1) a general measure of inflation, 
adjusted by an industry specific x-factor or (2) an cost index that isolates 
industry inputs from the rest of the economy, what remains are those 
drivers of risk and reward that are idiosyncratic to the individual firm.378  
That is precisely the room for managerial discretion that price-level 
regulation should be creating.  The single-parameter model of price-level 
regulation properly aligns beta with a rising index of input costs within an 
industry,379 and with it the expected cost of capital needed to attract 
investment in an industry whose costs are outstripping inflation. 
 
Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427–28 (1964). 
373.  See supra Table 4.  
374.  Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 263 U.S. 679, 
692 (1923); accord Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944). 
375.  See, e.g., William F. Sharpe, A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis, 9 MGMT. SCI. 
277, 281 (1963); Jack L. Treynor, How to Rate Management of Investment Funds, 43 HARV. 
BUS. REV. 63, 66 (1965). 
376.  See VICKERS & YARROW, supra note 145; Loube, supra note 145, at 289–90; 
Vogelsang, supra note 145, at 5, 10. 
377.  See supra Part V.B.2. 
378.  See Friend & Blume, supra note 330, at 561. 
379.  See id. at 562–64. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
“[N]either law nor economics has yet devised generally accepted 
standards for the evaluation of rate-making . . . .”380  Even at its best, 
public utility regulation “will always [raise] . . . embarrassing question[s]” 
of indeterminacy and inefficacy.381  As a consciously transitional 
regulatory tool, price-level regulation continues to strive toward bridging 
conventional rate-of-return regulation with outright deregulation.382 
Intense controversy over this technique suggests that price-level 
regulation has not “significantly reduce[d] the burden of regulatory 
proceedings” relative to the old rate-of-return methodology.383  Battles 
over inflation indexes, “the productivity offset and allowable exogenous 
costs” suggest that “price caps do not eliminate gamesmanship” from 
regulation.384  Paradoxically, contrary to the expectation “that price cap 
regulation will result in lower administrative costs” by lowering the need 
for “direct [governmental] oversight,” regulatory commissions in states 
applying price caps are twenty-five percent larger than commissions in 
states adhering to conventional rate-of-return regulation.385  The 
substitution of price-level regulation for its rate-of-return alternative has 
represented the regulators’ own “strategic response . . . to maintain 
relevancy in the volatile and uncertain environment” that has swamped 
many industries formerly subject to command-and-control oversight.386 
Despite these blemishes in execution, “it is arguably better to take the 
risk of capture” and other defects inherent in discretionary regulation 
“with price cap than with cost-of-service regulation, especially where 
efficiency incentives are important.”387  By enabling regulators to 
“control[] the prices of dominant firms” while leaving “control of their 
profits . . . to the competitive marketplace,” price-level regulation has 
proved “most effective as a transitory step on the path toward total 
deregulation and full competition.”388  In the three decades since its 
 
380.  Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 790 (1898); accord Duquesne Light 
Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1989). 
381.  Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 546 (1898); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308. 
382.  GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 3, at 219. 
383.  Id. at 242. 
384.  Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 487 (2002); see also USTA, 188 F.3d 
521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
385.  Jason R. Abel, Entry into Regulated Markets: The Development of a Competitive 
Fringe in the Local Telephone Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 289, 311 (2002). 
386.  Id. at 309. 
387.  GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 3, at 243. 
388.  Ronald R. Braeutigam & John C. Panzar, Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return 
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introduction, price-level regulation has become the dominant form of rate 
regulation in Great Britain and the United States.389  By 2002, no fewer 
than forty-eight states had adopted price-level regulation as their default 
method for regulating incumbent local exchange companies.390  Although 
critics continue to question whether price-level regulation provides 
adequate “incentives for capital investment,”391 its infusion of “stronger 
incentives to improve efficiency” demands that “price cap . . . be judged 
a great success.”392 
With good reason, the Supreme Court has characterized price-level 
regulation as the mostly successful “final stage in a century of developing 
ratesetting methodology.”393  As this Article has shown, the progressive 
streamlining of price-level regulation, from an elaborate variation on the 
theme of conventional ratemaking to a three-, two-, and finally single-
parameter exercise in patrolling utility prices according to price indexes 
beyond the control or influence of any regulated firm.  The emergence of 
price indexes for inputs purchased across entire industries, from 
transporters of petroleum and natural gas to conveyors of electricity and 
text messages, heralds the final and potentially most productive phase in 
the transformation of price-level regulation. 
 
Regulation to Price-Cap Regulation, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 191, 197 (1993). 
389.  See Ingo Vogelsang, Incentive Regulation and Competition in Public Utility Markets: 
A 20-Year Perspective, 22 J. REG. ECON. 5 (2002); cf. Christopher R. Knittel, Regulatory 
Restructuring and Incumbent Price Dynamics: The Casse of U.S. Local Telephone Markets, 86 
REV. ECON. & STAT. 614, 615 (2004). 
390.  See David E.M. Sappington, Price Regulation, in 1 HANDBOOK OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS: STRUCTURE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION 225 
(Martin Cave et al. eds., 2002). 
391.  GÓMEZ-IBÁÑEZ, supra note 3, at 241. 
392.  Id. at 240. 
393.  Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. United States, 535 U.S. 467, 487 (2002). 
